THE NEW REPUBLIC

JUL 26 1962
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Controlled Nuclear War

Michael Brower

Alfred Kazin as Critic

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July 30, 1962, 25

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Sitting on Its Hands

★ In the second year of Roosevelt's New Deal the Supreme Court intervened. It killed NRA, declared agriculture a local problem, outlawed a compulsory railway pension law, rejected a minimum wage for women and knocked off other measures. It created a constitutional crisis.

And now here we are again. Once more the essence of the crisis is that government lacks the power to govern. Better schools are desperately needed: they are blocked by one or two votes in the House Rules Committee; city dwellers comprise 70 percent of the population, they can't get a Department of Urban Affairs because rural legislators won't let them; Congress rejects a proposal to deal with the farm surplus, whose storage costs a billion dollars a year, but is incapable of producing its alternative controls. Senator Kefauver writes a 35-page consumer bill after a two-year drive to get safer, cheaper drugs but the Eastland committee leaves only 55 lines of the original. The House rejects, 232-164, the proposal to harness the free by-product steam at the Hanford, Washington, plutonium plant which would produce 800,000 kw of electricity; why? – the coal lobby objects.

And this is only the start. Lobbies are in control. A lobby has given the oil-gas industry a 27.5 percent tax rake-off in the oil depletion allowance; modify it? – not with the veto power of the oil Congressmen. Another lobby has made us subsidize sugar in half of Latin America in order to get prices high enough so we can grow sugar in the USA (which is like subsidizing banana-growing on Mount Rainier). The rest of the industrialized West has had health insurance since Bismarck but America can't have it because the medical trade union says "No."

Perhaps most serious of all, at least immediately – the government can't get the legislative tools to deal with the business cycle. Our personal guess is that we are heading smack into another recession (if it isn't here already). Congress has ignored Kennedy's pleas to give him flexible tools and left him only the alternative of a one-shot tax cut which, even if adopted, is very likely to be too small and too slow.

It is the essence of the two-phase American political system that periods of advance follow periods of consolidation, operating like a two-cylinder reciprocating engine. But what if the advance phase gets blocked? It did for FDR in 1935-36; it is happening again now. If it continues it produces a constitutional crisis.

Kennedy's election represented the break-through of the New American – the new ethnic, religious immigrant stock, the big city man. So what happened? Electing a Boston Irishman President automatically puts Eastland and Byrd in charge of Congress! Either one of a score of reactionary, segregationist moguls with seniority chairmanships in Congress can delay or kill a bill. They are the Supreme Court obstructionists of today. In the medicare bill vote, for example, the Democratic chairmen of 10 Senate committees voted against Kennedy.

Our curious government has two gears: normally it limps along aggravatingly in "low"; then in an emergency it leaps into "high" and works effectively. In an emergency the President takes semi-dictatorial powers. (We think this is an awfully dangerous system; it continually dangles temptation before strong leaders. Someday it is going to cause trouble.) The present Constitutional crisis may have to reach the emergency stage, it seems, before it gets any better.

What Can Kennedy Do?

★ What should Kennedy do? He has got to go out and educate the public, we think, as he should have from the first. Kennedy's goals are good but he has tried to "sell" Congress instead of the nation. There is danger, too, in his middle-road approach. In the Cuban crisis one group told him to go in, another to stay out, and Kennedy took the middle course which was the worst possible one to take.

So in the economic choice: conservatives a year ago told Kennedy to leave the economy alone; liberals urged him to act vigorously. Kennedy took a middle course and here we are with a recession ahead.

A President trying to get action must guide public opinion, that is his first job. Kennedy could have spent some of his immense 1961 Gallup poll popularity telling the nation unpopular things about the sluggish economy; he didn't and as the recovery slowed down Kennedy's popularity ebbed anyway.

Maybe we are crazy. But we think the cardinal thing the nation must realize is that it cannot allow 5 million unemployed workers to sit much longer on one side of an invisible line looking at 10 percent of America's factory capacity unemployed on the other. As somebody said – who was it? – we have got to get the country moving again.

CBS Reports

★ A jury awarded former CBS performer John Henry Falk $3.5 million libel damage the other day from a nasty witch-hunting crew called "Aware" that got him boycotted in the 1950's, and before we forget about it we want to make an observation. We think the jury punished the wrong party. They should have assessed the damage against Frank Stanton, head of CBS. Why did CBS let Falk go? Because it welshed in its moral responsibility to the nation; one of its men became "controversial," so they threw the innocent to the wolves, the way industrialists did Jews to Hitler. If Stanton has any reply we should like to hear it, in fact the public deserves it. How about a nice CBS documentary labeled, say, "How CBS yields to anti-Communist blackmail"? . . . We were impressed and moved by Martin Luther King who talked here last week. He speaks quietly, patiently, firmly, quotes Victor Hugo and Herbert Spencer, and follows Gandhi's non-violent civil disobedience technique. One of the most important living Americans, we should say.

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Come November

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When hasn't a progressive President's domestic program been clawed by the House of Representatives? Not for over a quarter of a century. The surprising thing about the drubbing Mr. Kennedy is getting is not that a conservative House is unfriendly, but that the President's majority in the Senate seems to be caving in. When the upper chamber on July 17 voted against health insurance for the aged, it gave the President a campaign issue, but what is he to do with it? Can he use it this autumn against his own party? In 1938, the "Unholy Alliance" of Southerners and Republicans so angered FDR he set out to purge those Democrats who were blocking his attempts to get the country moving again. The purge failed, and John F. Kennedy is not likely to repeat the experiment, though not a few columnists would enjoy watching him try. To do so would require, for instance, a Presidential declaration of war on the Democratic chairmen of most of the major committees of the Senate. Prominent among them would be Richard Russell of Georgia (Armed Services) who, as Roscoe Drummond pointed out, has voted against the President on 24 out of 59 recorded votes over the past five months; Senator Robertson of Virginia (Banking and Currency), anti-Kennedy 30 times; Senator Byrd of Virginia (Finance), against the President 32 times; Senator McClellan of Arkansas (29 nays) and Senator Eastland (31). And anyway, the 21 Southern and border state Democratic Senators (they include that old friend of medical care, Lister Hill of Alabama) who voted to kill the compromise health insurance measure so earnestly sought by the Administration, can relax. None of the 7 of them who are up for reelection this year has serious opposition. Most of the primaries are over. The same goes for Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills and other Democratic opponents of the bill in the House.

It is for such reasons that the President is expected to concentrate his political efforts this fall on holding and gaining House and Senate seats and governorships in welfare-minded states of the North and West – California, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, Illinois and possibly Massachusetts. These are the states which could give the President a working, rather than a nominal, control of the Congress (20 more Kennedy Democrats in the House might just make the difference); so these are the areas the President will visit. The field ripest for a Kennedy harvest lies in the West, where *Congressional Quarterly* classifies 11 Congressional districts as Doubtful, and an additional 12 as "Leaning Democratic" – the largest

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potential for a Democratic gain in any region. Most of the "Doubtful" 11 are newly-created districts in Governor Pat Brown's domain.

The defeat or neglect of so many Administration recommendations by Congress is prompting renewed cries for more aggressive White House leadership. What does that mean? There is justice in the view that the President has not explained clearly and often enough to the public what needs to be done at home and how it can be done; and justice too in the view that he and his advisers, preoccupied with the narrowness of Mr. Kennedy's electoral margin, have spent too much time feeling the nation's pulse and too little on setting its beat. But to believe that he alone can change the structure and composition of Congress is to misunderstand how jealously Congress patrols its own alleys.

Southern Congressional dominance is not of course eternal. One factor tending to undermine it in the Congress is the continuing decline of population in the South. Its grip will also be loosened as re-districting gives greater weight to the urban Southern vote, though this will not bring substantial relief. Most importantly, its influence will go down as the Democratic Party machinery in the North and West is built up. Here is where the President can do much by activating the party faithful. And here is where he will most likely be seen between now and November.

"Some of You Might Not Come Back . . ."

Norstad's Retirement

Although the retiring Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lyman Lemnitzer, has been made the fall guy in most press accounts, the President's wholesale rearrangement of his military high command last week appears to have been occasioned principally by Pentagon pressures to end the six-year tenure of General Lauris Norstad as commander of US and NATO forces in Europe. The surprising choice of Lemnitzer to succeed Norstad is said to have been envisaged as a graceful way to ease the departure of both men from their present posts. It was apparently not foreseen that press speculation centering on General Lemnitzer's identification with the Cuban invasion failure would make him appear to be a cast-off, and that the European reaction to his appointment would, therefore, be less than enthusiastic.

The crux of the running argument between General Norstad and the Pentagon has been the emphasis to be placed on preparation for tactical nuclear, as against conventional, war in Europe, and the degree to which tactical nuclear forces are to be integrated in the highly centralized Western command structure described by Secretary McNamara in his controversial June 16 speech at Ann Arbor. Against the advice of the Pentagon, General Norstad sought to increase the dispersion of the tactical nuclear weapons which have been made available (with the warheads under US control) to the West Germans. He has favored their deployment far down the line of command, their release for operation and training, and, in general has resisted the McNamara central command doctrine. At the same time, he has favored expanding the tactical weapons stockpile, and has shown a certain ambiguity with respect to the buildup of conventional forces by NATO members. To Norstad, conventional forces are important primarily to "enforce a pause" between the outbreak of hostilities and what he regards as the virtually inevitable use of tactical nuclear weapons. Thus he has been at odds not only with the influential authors of the new central control strategy in the McNamara regime at the Pentagon, but with all those who continue to work for a greater conventional buildup by both the US and the Europeans to avoid dependence on initiating the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Norstad also sought to obtain medium-range missiles for emplacement under his control on European and in particular West German territory. Pentagon planners, however, look to the emplacement of missiles for the defense of Europe at sea and in the US. Norstad was regarded as playing his own (and Defense Minister Strauss') rather than the Administration game.

Taken together, the removal of General Norstad and the elevation of General Maxwell Taylor to chairman-

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ship of the Joint Chiefs open the possibility of a welcome re-definition of US defense policy. For if NATO conventional forces were to be built up beyond the projected 30 divisions and principal reliance placed on the non-nuclear defense of Europe, this might serve to allay some of the widespread anxiety reflected in the critique of the McNamara strategy in this issue by Michael Brower. As for General Taylor, his emphasis on conventional as against nuclear weapons is well-known. It should nonetheless be noted that General Taylor made the decision during his tenure as Army Chief of Staff to establish Army nuclear forces (the Pentomic Division), and that he has gone along with the "flexible response" doctrine enunciated by Secretary McNamara.

UN Delinquents

By a 9 to 5 vote, the World Court has advised that the General Assembly does have the constitutional power to impose obligatory special assessments on all UN members, as it did in the case of the Middle East emergency force and the Congo operation. In effect, the Court has put its seal of approval on the constitutional process by which power has been shifted from the Security Council to the Assembly.

In the absence of a strong consensus overleaping national and ideological boundaries, a legal decision of this kind is only the beginning of the rule of law. It can either be used to develop and strengthen a consensus, or it can be used to exploit divisions and thus further weaken the United Nations. Certainly, for example, it would be a pyrrhic victory if France or the USSR or the Arab states, all of which are in arrears, left the UN, even temporarily.

The Court's opinion will probably make it easier to secure Congressional approval of US purchases of UN bonds. Hostile Congressmen who have asked why the US should lend money to the UN if other members haven't paid their bills, can be told that at least the World Court has said delinquents should pay up, and, that the long-range prospects for "more fiscal responsibility" are thus improved. But it would be unfortunate if Congress got the idea that the principle will be automatically and strictly enforced, for that would be to raise unwarranted expectations that would lead to disillusionment and ultimately weaken US support for the UN. The power of the Assembly to make assessments obligatory does not mean that it will or should always make them obligatory, rather than voluntary. For example, it would be of advantage now for the US to have the UN militarily present in Vietnam, even though our government had to pay the bulk of the expense, as it did in Korea.

FOOTNOTES *to the* WEEK

THE "LIBERAL WING" of the GOP is off to a good start in the intra-party contest for control. By the end of June "moderate" Republicans had defeated Conservatives in 15 of 23 pre-election primary and convention tests between the factions. Eight more major party show-downs are in the offing from now until November – one of the most interesting the September 11 Senatorial primary in New Hampshire. —— JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH *is planning to relinquish his post as Ambassador to India early next year. Persistent illness and the pending expiration of his leave of absence from Harvard are cited as the principal factors in his decision. When Mr. Galbraith mentioned his desire to retire last month, the President is said to have asked him to stay on at least until February.* —— AMERICAN BUSINESS opinion in Japan is openly critical of Ambassador Edwin Reischauer. NBC correspondent Cecil Brown, who often reflects the mood of the business community in Tokyo, attacked Reischauer in a broadcast on July 14. Referring to favorable accounts of Reischauer's resumption of the "broken dialogue" with the Japanese non-Communist Left, he declared that the real "broken dialogue" is with business and that the US Ambassador should speak the language of commerce. He charged that Japanese-Soviet trade deals are increasing. —— AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN *are reportedly near a solution to a year-long border dispute which has cut off Afghan trade access to the sea and tightened her economic dependence on the Soviet Union. The Shah of Iran volunteered his "good offices" and has already conferred with Pakistan leaders. He is scheduled to fly next week to Kabul.* —— NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS underground in Nevada have not been as free from fallout as the public assumes, according to physicist Ralph Lapp. As a result of "venting," large quantities of Iodine-131, which causes thyroid cancer in children, have been escaping, and deposits have already been recorded in dangerously large quantities near Troy, New York. —— CHESTER BOWLES *has urged "priority support" for the "handful of developing nations" that measure up to five aid criteria – tax and land reforms, foreign exchange controls, integrated community development programs, and "a reasonably competent government." Urging a cutback in aid for lagging regimes, the White House adviser said in a June 19 Chicago speech that "expending aid without insisting on reforms is a kind of 'interference' . . . on the side of forces of the past. . . . I can see no valid reason why American taxpayers should be asked to help developing countries which lack the will or the vigor to help themselves."*

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MACMILLAN HAS HIS CAST ASSEMBLED FOR THE NEXT ELECTION

New Team for the Tories

London

The Tories are just getting their breath back. The lopping-off of 16 ministerial heads, the jangling hours awaiting the summons to Admiralty House, the "sack yourself" letters dispatched by Iain Macleod to 600 constituency party notables, the sympathetic back-bench clustering round poor old Selwyn Lloyd, the angry missives to *The Times* – it was a lively week while it lasted. Even the posh political commentators, who had been calling for changes since Lloyd's budget in April, were duly stunned: they pronounced it a cataclysm, a holocaust, an abattoir, and who could be expected to analyze an abattoir? But the simple common denominator of the reshuffle is that in every major post a worthy but incoherent minister has been replaced by a bright and lucid one. This is particularly true of the replacement of Selwyn Lloyd (aged 57) at the Treasury by Reggie Maudling (aged 45): the most admired of Conservative statements of faith in this year of the Liberal upsurge has been Maudling's manifesto to his constituents two months ago on the new social priorities of the 1960s. It is true of Peter Thorneycroft's appointment to the Ministry of Defense in place of the capable but stiff-necked Harold Watkinson, and of the emergence of the whiz-kid baronets Sir Edward Boyle (38) and Sir Keith Joseph (44) in full cabinet fig as ministers of education and housing – both departments of critical interest to the lower middle-class voters who have been absconding into the Liberal ranks. It is true of the rapid elevation of a professional journalist, William Deedes of the Tory *Daily Telegraph*, to be, in effect, the cabinet's own political correspondent. It is personality that has mattered to Macmillan, not identification with particular policies.

There will be changes in policy, too; Macmillan had indicated this even before the firing of Lloyd. But they will be changes of degree, not of kind. The Tories cannot desert the concept of wage and salary restraints, but Maudling is expected to relax its restrictive application (especially on government employees like nurses, teachers and social workers) as part of a gentle reflation of the economy. More money is likely to be disbursed to broaden the base of higher education and to renovate the worst twilight areas of the Victorian cities. There will be great play with measures to protect the consumer and to raise the worker's status. In short, the Tories are tooling up for an election, probably next year, as soon as their new team has successes to point to. The final twist to Macmillan's resolve came after the latest in this year's long series of by-elections, at Leicester Northeast, where the Tories, who had almost wrested this industrial seat from Labour in 1959, were pushed into a humiliating third place by the rampant Liberals. The story goes that the Prime Minister was actually confronted with an ultimatum by Butler, Macleod and Maudling to rejuvenate the cabinet or accept their own resignations.

But it may be most significant of all that the reshuffle has come before the final terms have arrived from Brussels for any entry into the Common Market. The cannier Tory strategists had expected Macmillan first to make up his mind on the price demanded by "The Six" and then to go ahead either with a cabinet of enthusiastic pro-Europeans or, if things went the other way, of pronounced Commonwealth men. He has settled now for men who could jump either way, but who are, above all, likely to jump together. Butler began with pronounced doubts about Europe: he has come slowly round in the belief that the farmers, to whom he is personally pledged, could get comfortable safeguards. Maudling, the creator of the anti-Common Market European Free Trade Association (the Seven), has been wooed into taking a more sympathetic view of Europe – as an expansionist. Duncan Sandys, in the past a strong pro-European, has been retained in the cabinet specifically as the Commonwealth watchdog he proclaimed himself to be at the last party conference. This careful balance at the very point of equilibrium suggests that pretty tough terms are expected from Brussels, so tough that Macmillan needs a conspectus of open-minded opinion at the top in order to preserve party unity if he still decides to take the plunge.

The overriding feeling is that de Gaulle and Adenauer are now talking exclusively to Washington, not London. They want their concept of Europe, and their concept of the European role in the Atlantic alliance, to prevail before they will accept Britain, almost as an American nominee and client, inside their citadel. It will be on whether or not they have their way, now that General Norstad is departing from NATO, that the final French price for New Zealand butter and Australian meat will depend. Equally, British opinion, in all parties (*vide* Gaitskell's recent blood-spitting row with the European socialists) is only belatedly waking up to the fact that the European issue is primarily a

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political one, and that Britain's friends on the continent are precisely the men who want a tight, political union – not the *Europe des patries* which de Gaulle (and, thinking of national sovereignty, Macmillan and Gaitskell) incline to. The Tories who are urging on Macmillan the role of European statesmanship, which he would candidly enjoy, point to the glittering opportunity: a line-up of British, the Dutch, the Danes, the Italians, the Norwegians – and the West German opposition to Adenauer. Such a coalition could make Europe the kind of integrated, pro-American partner that President Kennedy wants and that British opinion itself has always favored for NATO. The danger is that this realization may have come too late to give British policy the flexibility and determination needed to get past the resistance in Paris. ALASTAIR BURNET

THE PIVOTAL QUESTION IS: WHAT HAPPENS TO THE ARMY?

Algeria's Feuding Leaders

Paris

There are now no less than 865 press reporters in Algeria, more than covered Kennedy's and Khrushchev's visits to France. According to these observers, the danger of a fractured "Congolized" Algeria seems to have been averted – at least for the time being. Nonetheless, as of this writing the two national leaders, Ahmed Ben Bella and the President of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, are still at loggerheads.

The United States and Russia always want to know "who is for us?" – a question which, as we shall see, is futile in this instance. Neither the Marxist schooling of Ben Khedda nor the Arab orientation of Ben Bella prevents either man from favoring absolute Algerian neutrality in foreign affairs and socialism in the country.

Ben Bella, who appears to be gaining the upper hand, accuses his President of degrading the chief of staff of the Algerian National Liberation Army and his two assistants, and of seeking to dissolve that army. By proceeding with this dissolution, Ben Bella claims, the President of the Provisional Government of Algeria is emasculating the revolution and causing it to founder in a reformist movement comparable to that of the Tunisians and the Moroccans.

For his part, Ben Khedda charges that a segment of the National Liberation Army was getting ready to set up a police dictatorship with the backing of Ben Bella. Thus, he says, he is justified in emasculating that army.

What about these two protagonists?

There is nothing about Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, either in appearance or manner, to remind one that he is Arabian, or even Mediterranean. He is a balanced, reflective sort of person who always delivers his speeches by reading them aloud. His narrow-rimmed eyeglasses, his diction, his gestures are professional, and this scholarly appearance is only slightly belied by a decided chin and an obstinate forehead. The fact that he can pass for a European has served him well: in 1957, during the famous battle of Algiers, he was able to elude all of General Massu's police units.

When the famed call to arms of November 1, 1954, was sounded, Ben Khedda was in prison. Although he had had no part in touching off the insurrection against France, he was able, from his cell, to communicate his agreement to Ben Bella (who was then in Cairo) and to the insurrectionists who were setting up the first Unity and Action Committee in Algiers. He stayed in prison until the moment Ben Bella was jailed by the French. Thus, the two men never really got to know each other.

But in any case, they are separated by background. Ben Bella is a child of the proletariat and never attended school; Ben Khedda is from the *petit bourgeois* and became a pharmacist. Ben Bella looks to Cairo for the sources of Arab nationalism and visualizes Algeria's revolution as patterned after Nasser's uprising; Ben Khedda has frequented French Marxist circles and although he is a practicing Moslem still looks with longing toward the achievements of socialism. The situation today is in many ways a paradox: Ben Khedda, whom Ben Bella now accuses of reformism, bore the nickname of "the Chinaman" because of his notorious respect for Mao Tse-tung.

Then too, we cannot disregard the fact that Ben Bella has the faults of an Arab to an excessive degree. He has that rather glowing and volatile magnetism which one encounters in all the ports of the Mediterranean. He would just as soon charm people to his way of thinking as convince them intellectually. He is voluble, nervous and achieves authority by his loquacity. His self-confidence and his completely extroverted personality cause him to give more thought to questions directly posed than to files and written reports sub-

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mitted to him. The most dramatic paradox in Ben Bella's case is that although from the very outset he felt himself to be the providentially "chosen" man of the hour and the one who, solely by his efforts, touched off the insurrection, he remained in prison from 1956 to 1962; nor did he serve as a negotiator in concluding the peace. Yet imprisonment undoubtedly enhanced Ben Bella's image as a martyred hero, the *zaim* which, in Arabic, means one who is above all leaders. So exalted was this image that one could scarcely blame Ben Bella for believing that the majority was awaiting his coming and that it was impossible for him to accept any but the leading role.

Yet there is a basic problem which supersedes any differences of temperament or background between Ben Khedda and Ben Bella: the army.

What used to be known as the Algerian Army was made up principally of *maquis*, of fighters in the interior, of groups of secret terrorists or organized bands – in short, the sort of fighters lumped together under the category of "guerrillas." The saga of these frontier units will be written some day, and it will be as thrilling as that of the Yugoslavian partisans or the Cuban rebels. All the various successive Algerian military chiefs left their mark on these units, one after the other. Finally, however, a completely unorthodox personage was named chief of staff of the Algerian Army. He might have been taken straight from the pages of a Malraux novel. Burning with a sort of dry passion for his Algeria, ascetic, austere, matter-of-fact, humorless and elegant, he abolished the officers' stripes and the privileges of rank, multiplied the political commissioners, and had one aim only: to transform soldiers into militants. This man was Colonel Boumédienne.

Gradually, as the rifts among the civilian leaders of the Algerian revolution widened in the course of secret and public negotiations with the French, this army of the frontiers gained strength, cohesion and self-confidence, and finally achieved a menacing autonomy. In fact, the National Liberation Army attained such independence that it was holding press conferences, maintaining its own doctrinal and propaganda publications, and multiplying its liaison efforts with those maquis who, it felt, were too loyal to the civilian groups.

Everyone who met Colonel Boumédienne was won over by his natural qualities of leadership. To no one has he seemed a man motivated by personal ambition. One of his favorite remarks, however, has captured everyone's attention: *"We are not mercenaries, nor are we career soldiers; we are militants and our job is to see that the revolution is carried out. We shall never return to soldiers' barracks."*

One need only bear this *pronunciamento* in mind to grasp what tremendous problems such a man can create for a chief of state whose main concern is to bring order to a new nation. The difficulties created by the partisans of the French Resistance of 1945, when attempts were made to disarm them or incorporate them into the regular army, are as nothing compared with the situation in Algeria. The final touch of seriousness is added by the fact that henceforth this army will enjoy the backing of Ben Bella.

At this point we may rightly ask: how far-reaching is this popularity of Ben Bella's? In Kabylia, the Berber cradle of the Algerian revolution, it is practically nil, since Pan Arabism has no attraction there. It is very weak throughout the region of Greater Algeria, held by modern anti-militaristic leaders. Among the élite, the youthful intellectuals, and the politically sophisticated maquis, it is completely non-existent. Among the Algerian masses, however, Ben Bella's popularity is overwhelming, and it gains strength from the backing of the National Liberation Army. Yet this backing is of a highly transitory nature. If Ben Bella were to become the head of the Algerian Government, then he too would have to absorb the National Liberation Army. And if Colonel Boumédienne's statement is rightly construed, it would appear that his army hopes to substitute itself for the People's Party which Ben Bella dreams of constituting.

The impasse is real, and the question is: how to get out of it? The supreme authority of the Algerian revolution is the National Council of the Algerian revolution (CNRA), a sort of parliament uniting all those who played a part in the revolution over these past seven years. The CNRA was once at the root of all the recent divisiveness but, if it were convened for the first time in Algeria as the new nation, it might prove the agency for reconciliation. In any case, it is the sole remaining hope.

JEAN DANIEL

"Arabs First, Last and Always"

"My whole political past demonstrates clearly that I am firmly opposed to racism. Some of my best friends are Jews and there were Jews among my defenders in the lawyers' collective. I shall never forget what they have done for our revolution. I shall never permit racial discrimination in my country! When I said that we were 'Arabs first, last and always', this was in Tunis, and it had a very specific political meaning. I wanted to emphasize that the Arab world is neutralist. For me, the concept of Arabism is not a racial one, but rather an ethical concept, a sort of humanism which is never turned against anyone."

– AHMED BEN BELLA,
in an interview with K. S. Karol,
L'Express, *July 13, 1962*

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McNAMARA'S STRATEGY – I

"The United States has come to the conclusion," said Secretary of Defense McNamara on June 16, "that . . . principal military objectives in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population." It may then be possible, he said, to engage in thermonuclear war while "preserving the fabric of our societies." This speech has provoked widespread discussion, including charges – and denials – that the Kennedy Administration has endorsed a "first strike." Michael Brower, who teaches political economy at the MIT School of Industrial Management, here opens a debate which will be continued in subsequent issues by Morton Halperin and Robert Osgood.

Controlled Thermonuclear War

by Michael Brower

When the Kennedy Administration took office it inherited an unresolved debate about nuclear strategy. On one side stood Navy officers like Admiral Burke and Army officers like General Taylor, supported by such scientists as George Rathjens, Leo Szilard, Bernard Feld, Richard Leghorn, and the President's Science Advisor Jerome Wiesner, who argued that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could hope during the 1960's to initiate a thermonuclear war without incurring unacceptable retaliation. The only function of the US nuclear arsenal would therefore be to deter the Soviets from initiating such a war, and to prevent them from blackmailing us or our allies by threatening to do so. Efforts to meet Soviet diplomatic or conventional military moves by threatening to start a thermonuclear war would, then, be either hot air or madness. According to this school of thought the only sane way to parry non-nuclear threats – including a possible massive Soviet ground attack in Europe – would be to strengthen Western non-nuclear forces. In the nuclear realm all the Pentagon would need to implement this second-strike-only strategy would be what is variously called a "balanced," "limited," "finite," "minimum," or "pure" deterrent: enough missiles hidden underground and under the sea to destroy Russia's major cities after surviving the worst attack our intelligence indicated the Soviets could conceivably mount.

On the other side of the debate were Air Force generals like Nathan Twining, Curtis LeMay and Thomas White, supported in part (and with various limitations and modifications) by theorists such as Herman Kahn and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Henry Rowen (both then with the RAND Corporation). These strategists claimed that America still needed nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union because if nuclear war ever came, either at our initiative or theirs, we would want not only to destroy Soviet cities but also Soviet nuclear forces. Only by destroying these forces could we end the war on favorable terms.

This doctrine was known as "counter-force." Under Eisenhower it was the accepted strategy, although the Air Force never got all the hardware it wanted to implement it. To make it work the US needed exact information about the location of Soviet missiles and bombers. (Hence the U-2 and now the Samos reconnaissance satellite.) We also needed at least two or three (and possibly more) missiles for each known Soviet missile or air base, in order to be sure of destroying them should war come. (Hence superiority.)

Given the Truman-Eisenhower doctrine that under certain circumstances (notably a massive ground attack on Europe) the US would launch a nuclear first strike, US acceptance of a "counter-force" strategy was virtually inevitable. Neither the Soviets nor our European allies would believe in our threat to unleash SAC unless we could do it without having American society destroyed by Soviet retaliation. Still, counter-force was not a purely first-strike doctrine. Even if the Soviets struck first, they would presumably not use every missile and bomber they had, and it would still be of some importance for us to destroy those that remained. This would give Americans who had survived

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the Soviet first strike a better chance of surviving the war and would give America a larger voice in writing the peace. Yet the ability to attack largely empty Soviet missile pads and alerted Soviet bomber bases, while of some value, did not seem very important, and most of those who felt strongly about the development of counter-force weapons and targeting plans thought of this primarily as a first-strike doctrine.

But counter-force had deficiencies. Even the most optimistic Air Force planners were convinced that we could never knock out all Soviet missiles and bombers in a first strike. Enough might survive to inflict staggering losses on the US – perhaps 50 or 100 million. If this was the price of a first strike, both Europeans and Russians might well doubt we were prepared to pay it. And once they began to doubt, conventional attack on Europe began to seem conceivable, at least to some academic theorists.

Kennedy's Dilemma

In Kennedy's first six months there were indications that we were moving away from counter-force toward limited deterrence. Two special Defense messages to Congress requested extra funds to increase our ability both to fight conventional wars and to ride out any nuclear attack and still respond. In both messages the President explained our strategy in the language of limited deterrence: *e.g.* "Our strategic arms and defense must be adequate to deter any deliberate nuclear attack on the US or our allies – by making clear to any potential aggressor that sufficient retaliatory forces will be able to survive a first strike and penetrate his defense in order to inflict unacceptable losses upon him." Many authors and students of defense policy assumed Kennedy was leading up to a renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons, at least on the strategic level, and preparing to rely on the growing conventional power of the West to deter conventional Soviet aggression.

Nevertheless President Kennedy had inherited a counter-force doctrine which called for hitting all known Soviet bases (and many cities as well), a huge set of photos of the Soviet Union from the U-2 flights, and a Samos reconnaissance satellite in late stages of development. He also inherited an overwhelming superiority in nuclear bombers and a slight but rapidly growing advantage in missiles. Strong domestic forces militated against Kennedy's dropping counter-force. The Democrats still felt vulnerable to the charge of appeasement. Besides, they had campaigned in 1960 on the inadequacy of our missile forces, and it was hard enough to admit that our forces were in fact adequate, without going all the way and saying that they were now, or soon would be, too large. Then too, the country was struggling (unsuccessfully, it now appears) out of a recession, which is not an easy time to cut down bomber and missile production. Finally, to accept a minimal second-strike-only deterrent seemed to mean resigning from part of the arms race and accepting a draw. This would have flown in the face of much of the American tradition, and the upbringing of many top governmental leaders.

Given the nuclear lead and the knowledge of Soviet base locations that he inherited, and given the forces pressing on him for military expansion, it would have been hard for any President to reverse our course. Yet President Kennedy, notably in his United Nations speech, showed signs of understanding the horrors that lie down the road we are following. Had no other factors intervened he might still have taken the course of greater restraint. Unfortunately, serious problems arose in Europe, and these were apparently decisive. How could we defend Europe (and especially Berlin) from a major conventional attack if we didn't build and maintain a first strike nuclear capability? And how could we stop the growth of an independent nuclear force in France (and, soon, in other countries) if our pledge to use US nuclear weapons in defense of Europe looked like an only half believable pledge to commit suicide?

The "conventional attack" problem at first seemed soluble. President Kennedy began to revamp the US Army, raising its combat strength from 11 to 16 divisions and developing newer and better conventional arms and air-lift. He also increased the pressures on our allies to meet their NATO force goals (though with less immediate result).

But then came Khrushchev's renewed efforts to change the status of Berlin and East Germany. According to Walter Lippmann, the President came back from Vienna in June with the distinct impression that Khrushchev was going to use force of some kind to make us give up West Berlin. President Kennedy rushed US troops to Europe, stockpiled supplies for still more divisions, called up reserves and guard units, and lit hotter fires under the slow-moving Europeans to get them to meet their quotas. All of this "worked," in the sense that it improved the conventional defenses of Western Europe. By August 3 the *Wall Street Journal* was able to report that the West had more armed men on the Central European front than the Soviets did. (The notorious 175 Soviet divisions were, the Pentagon has announced, highly over-rated. Many are pinned down preventing revolts in Hungary, Poland, and East Germany. Many are far back in Russia. Many are far below strength. Even at full strength Soviet divisions are smaller than Western divisions.) Since it has long been recognized that conventional forces can maintain an adequate defense against attacking forces twice (and

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sometimes even three or more times) their strength, East-West parity seemed to provide a considerable margin of safety against most dangers.

But in Berlin the West was not, militarily speaking, on the defensive. If the Soviets or the East Germans cut our supply lines, NATO forces would have to push forward through scores of miles of perhaps stubbornly held East German territory. (Apparently an air lift is no longer considered technically feasible.) All the advantages which accrue to the defender would in this case favor the Communists, not the West. As a result, the armed defense of Western rights in Berlin seemed then, and still seems today, impossible with any foreseeable levels of conventional Western forces. The President, determined to defend Berlin by force rather than negotiate under heavy pressure, could not do so without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. (There is considerable evidence that US and British forces were then, and are perhaps still today, so poorly equipped and trained with conventional arms that they would have had to use nuclear weapons in heavy fighting no matter what the military situation.) Since Western "tactical" nuclear weapons could be at least partly matched by the Soviets, and since most strategists agreed that their use might very quickly escalate upward into general war, the President found himself also forced to imply, if not directly threaten, that the US would if necessary use its whole arsenal of bombs and missiles to defend Berlin. His main technique for trying to make this seem believable to Khrushchev, aside from raising the degree of involvement of US forces on the spot, was to emphasize civil defense. He, or his advisors, also began to search for a nuclear strategy which might allow him to defend Berlin without destroying America.

McNamara's Solution

On June 16, 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara unveiled the answer in a speech at Ann Arbor – a speech which was reportedly a watered-down version of what he had said the previous month to the NATO Council in Athens. The plan was a refinement, long advocated by academic strategists, of the old counter-force theory:

"The US has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.

"The very strength and nature of the alliance forces make it possible for us to retain, even in the face of a massive surprise attack, sufficient reserve striking power to destroy an enemy society if driven to it. In other words, we are giving a possible opponent the strongest imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our own cities."

With this strategy, as McNamara explained, thermonuclear war could bring grave damage, but we would be able to "preserve the fabric of our societies." Although he did not specifically say so, one meaning of this is that Berlin could be defended without completely annihilating America. (Whether it could be defended without itself being destroyed was another question.)

The other major military problem bothering the Administration was how to halt the spread of nuclear weapons among European (and eventually non-European) countries. We had to convince our allies that our nuclear force would deter Soviet nuclear attacks on them as well – that we would regard "an attack on Paris as an attack on Chicago," and would respond with our strategic forces even though this would presumably bring destruction to hitherto intact Chicago.

An early effort to allay their fears and to forestall independent nuclear forces was the offer at Ottawa in May, 1961, of "a NATO seaborne missile force which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, if this should be desired by and found feasible by our allies. . . ." But truly multilateral ownership and control is still nowhere within sight. Most countries want their own finger on the trigger; most also want their own thumb on the safety catch to prevent others' pulling the trigger. The US assignment of five Polaris submarines to NATO at the May, 1962, Athens meeting was therefore seen only as a token step since these vessels remain manned and commanded by Americans.

To further improve the "credibility" of US nuclear pledges, the "no-cities" doctrine, which suggested that the US could use its nuclear strength to defend Europe without committing suicide, seemed ideal. Not only did it make US forces more useful in defending Europe, but it made European forces seem positively dangerous. In the June 16 speech Secretary McNamara said that "relatively weak national nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets are not likely to be sufficient to perform even the function of deterrence. . . . Indeed, if a major antagonist came to believe there was a substantial likelihood of it being used independently, this force would be inviting a preemptive first strike against it. . . . We are convinced that a general nuclear war target system is indivisible, and if, despite all our efforts, nuclear war should occur, our best hope lies in conducting a centrally controlled campaign against all of the enemy's vital nuclear capabilities, while retaining reserve forces, all centrally controlled."

But the British (whom McNamara quickly exempted

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from his strictures) and French are not to be so easily dissuaded from their drive for independent nuclear forces. This is in part because their goals are as much related to prestige and political influence within NATO as they are to security, and in part because they did not think much of the reasoning behind McNamara's new strategic doctrine.

The No-Cities Panacea

The "no-cities" plan is, in a sense, an extension of the theory of limited nuclear warfare. It is widely agreed today that fighting in Western Europe with so-called tactical nuclear weapons would be extremely unlikely to remain limited. Bombing which began at or near a battle line would rapidly thrust into the Soviet and Western European homelands as each side tried to catch the other's troop reinforcements as they were being moved forward to replace those lost, and as each side used airfields farther and farther back from the battle line after those close to the front were destroyed. There are, in short, few natural geographical barriers to help keep nuclear war limited in Europe.

The new Administration apparently had little faith in geographic limitations, but it is still trying to put limits on targets and weapons. In a no-cities war the Soviet Union and the United States would, however, have to be able to distinguish, with their missiles, between the bases and the cities of the opponent. Admiral Burke, who didn't think much of this idea, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in April, 1961:

> "Yes, sir. Many of these missile bases are right close to our cities, right close, so are many of our other bases. So an attack on our major bases would necessarily destroy a great many cities and a great many of our people. When those missiles start coming over you do not know whether the intent of the enemy was to hit or not to hit a city if he hits it. The same thing is true with the Russian military installations."

No-city proponents argue that none of the largest cities are near missile bases, and that we might be able to move some of the military bases away from smaller cities. But a problem still remains: how major civilian airports can be destroyed without hitting their "attached" cities. These airports are considered military targets because bombers can be dispersed to them and can re-fuel and maybe even re-load bombs for another flight from them. And major US and Soviet cities are also ringed with anti-aircraft missiles which the opponent must hit with his missiles before sending in his bombers. These anti-aircraft installations should be destroyed in the first counter-force strike, for if the enemy strikes back against your missiles you may not have enough left to destroy his anti-aircraft. In that event most of your bombers will be shot down, and most of the advantage of striking first will be lost.

But if either anti-aircraft missiles or civilian airports are destroyed with standard missiles in the megaton range, tremendous destruction will occur in the nearby cities. The only alternative is for each side to build hundreds of expensive invulnerable missiles and load them with "low" (10-20 kiloton?) yield bombs suitable for destroying small targets with a minimum of side damage (while also building missiles with huge warheads to destroy hardened weapons.) Nobody has built such small weapons. Will they do so?

In order to keep the war limited each side must also be willing to settle for less than total victory – for a compromise. (Given both personal and national biases, it is probable that to reach a settlement each country would actually have to settle for what it regarded as a defeat.) It might be asked why, if we are unwilling to settle for a draw in the arms race now, we are more likely to settle for one during a war? Does nuclear war make men more rational and restrained? Most Americans seem to feel that the cold war is a battle of virtue *vs* evil. Will their government compromise with evil during a war? We didn't in World Wars I and II, which were fought as crusades, and we almost didn't in Korea.

A US counter-force first-strike capability is most strongly advocated by those who think it is going to enable the US to "win" a nuclear war, or at least to "prevail" in one. Said General Frederic Smith, then Air Force Vice Chief of Staff: "Ours must be a war-fighting posture, based upon the strategic force capabilities which provide confidence in a war-winning strategy. . . . our strategic concept . . . requires a war-waging capability – our primary goal is to deter war; but, if deterrence fails, we must have the capability to fight and to prevail." Will General Smith and his colleagues be trying desperately to carry out a national policy of slow-down, of target and weapons limitation, of compromise and stalemate in a nuclear war?

Communication is another problem. Aside from the tremendous difficulty of maintaining foolproof command and control over all Western forces, there is the problem of talking to Khrushchev – or his successor. As Jerome Wiesner has written: "In conflict situations . . . statements of antagonists are evaluated not in terms of the intended meanings, but rather in terms of the most threatening alternatives. This is particularly true when survival is believed to be at stake." Would it be possible, for example, for either the Premier or the President, talking through static and interpreters, to convince the other that his suggestion of a 48 hour cease-fire was anything more than a ruse to gain time for bomber refueling, reloading and repair? Or for

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missile re-mounting, if this becomes possible? In earlier wars it was possible to pause for negotiation without giving up any vital position. Today, when time and information are among each side's most valuable counters, this will be harder.

Still another difficulty with the "no cities" strategy is that decisions on which missiles to fire at which targets, which bombers to send, which to hold back, which missiles to retarget because others have been destroyed – all will have to be made with split-second timing by the President (or his successor if he is killed) and the Air Force and Navy Officers under him. As Secretary McNamara said on February 17, 1962: "Our new policy gives us the flexibility to choose among several operational plans, but does not require that we make any advance commitment with respect to doctrine or targets. We shall be committed only to a system that gives us the ability to use our forces in a controlled and deliberate way." Earlier he had told a Congressional Committee that even the decision whether to retaliate against Soviet bases or cities would be "a question of operational plans to be decided under the circumstances at the time."

This idea of "controlled response" is the most fundamental part of the new strategy as seen by Kennedy and McNamara, both of whom naturally want to retain maximum last minute freedom of choice. But how realistic is it? Even given the best intentions, and an absolutely flawless communications systems, is it safe to assume that the human beings in charge at each level of command will operate in a cool, rational way in crisis situations of high emotion and extremely rapid decision making? No doubt some men will operate this way. But who will doubt that some will not? It only takes a handful to undermine the whole strategy and unleash an all-out city-busting war.

Will the Soviets "Play Ball"?

Even if we refrain from hitting Soviet cities, will they refrain from hitting ours? The adoption of a no-city doctrine is only attractive to a nation which has a well-developed counter-force weapons system. Such a system requires several missiles for every enemy missile, *i.e.*, overwhelming nuclear superiority. It is clearly impossible for both the US and USSR to have such superiority. So long as the USSR remains weaker than the US, it is unlikely to adopt a no-city strategy. Suppose, for example, that the Soviets have 100 missiles and we have 200. If they launch 75 of these missiles against ours, and are highly successful, they might destroy 50 of ours. We would then have 150 left and they would have 25. Our advantage would have risen from 2:1 to 6:1. This is hardly an improvement from the Soviet viewpoint, and certainly not an objective for which they would initiate thermonuclear war. If they should ever be mad enough to attack they would more likely try to destroy our society rather than simply weakening themselves by exchanging missiles. Alternately, suppose that we launch 150 of our 200 missiles and destroy 90 of their 100. Will they launch the remaining 10 against our empty missile pads, or against our dispersed and air-alerted bombers? Hardly likely. They may conceivably surrender, or they may strike back against our cities, but one thing they almost certainly won't do is strike our bases.

Secretary McNamara himself is a recent convert to the doctrine of no-cities. On August 1, 1961, he told the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations that was studying the Administration's Civil Defense requests that "I think that in order to avoid confusing the planning on the local level it would be wise to pick an attack that is both most likely, and also the largest – and I believe that the largest is the most likely – and base the local planning on that assumption. . . ." On November 17, at a press conference, he was more explicit: "I think it is at least as likely that our cities would be attacked as that our military targets would be attacked. I don't share the views of some that only the military installations would be targeted." And as recently as February 2, 1962, he made the following response before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee:

Mr. Minshall (R, Ohio): "Can you imagine any situation where the Soviets would attempt to spare our cities?"

Secretary McNamara: "I can imagine such a situation, yes. I am not suggesting that I think it highly probable . . ."

One cannot avoid noticing how marvelously the timing of Mr. McNamara's conversion to the no-cities doctrine coincided with the NATO meetings, at which

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it was very convenient for him to argue that US nuclear threats did not necessarily depend on US readiness to commit national suicide.

A final unpleasant question about the no-cities doctrine: suppose we do get into general nuclear war and the strategy works – cities *are* spared. How many people would nonetheless die? On this question Assistant Secretary of Defense Steuart Pittman presented charts showing official estimates to the House Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee hearings on March 13 of this year.

These charts show that in a pure counter-force, no-cities attack, the Defense Department expects to lose (reading roughly from a poorly marked graph) between 30 and 150 million people, depending on the size of the attack. This assumes no civil defense program. With 235 million totally adequate fallout shelter spaces the Defense Department expects that US casualties in a no-cities war could be held to between 4 and 27 million. Such shelter could not, however, be available before 1967, even if things go as smoothly as Mr. Pittman hopes – which seems, to put it mildly, improbable (and for various reasons, undesirable). Further, even the top figure of 27 million is based on a number of extremely optimistic assumptions, (*e.g.*, that everyone will go to the shelter to which he is assigned, even through it is not the closest to his home). And, since a no-cities policy looks to the Soviets like a first-strike policy, it will presumably encourage them to accelerate their formerly slow pace of missile building (judged by the fact that they built only 3.5 percent of what official intelligence believed they could and would build from 1958 to 1961). All this means that the larger figures are the more probable, and even these may well be low.

And what if no-cities war "slips" into a counter-force *plus* counter-city war, as seems very likely? The Defense Department predicts 83 to 175 million US dead. Or after the five year perfect fallout shelter programs, 50-130 million (assuming a population then of 200 million). While Administration witnesses like to emphasize the many millions of people that could be saved by fighting no-city war, it must not be forgotten that scores of millions will die in *any* nuclear war.

No Cities: A Harmless Panacea?

In summary, the no-cities doctrine might be likened to a patent medicine: Harmless, and possibly even somewhat helpful, if taken in small doses, so long as misplaced faith in its beneficial effects does not inhibit serious efforts to find a real cure. Harmless, and possibly helpful, that is, except that it is inextricably linked, no matter what Mr. McNamara may say, to a counter-force first strike strategy. To talk about a "no-city" second strike is realistic only if the Soviets are able to launch a no-city first strike. So long as they remain weaker than the US they will not contemplate such a strike. And weaker than the US is just what the Administration wants the Soviets to be for the foreseeable future.

At present we have 82 ICBM's, to a reported Soviet 50-75; we have over 600 B-52's and nearly 100 B-58's, to the Soviets' estimated 400 to 800 one-way-only me- have around 900 aging medium bombers with highly developed refueling capabilities for round-trip strikes, to the Soviets' estimated 400 to 800 one-way-only medium bombers; we have 128 Polaris missiles on 8 submarines, and the Soviets are estimated to have "a few" submarines capable of firing missiles after surfacing. In addition we have 1000-2000 carrier- and overseas-based fighter-bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons to the Soviet Union, and around 100 IRBM's based in Europe aimed at the Soviet Union (useful, incidentally, only for a US first strike). The Soviets are said to have several hundred IRBM's capable of reaching Europe but not the US. The British have something like 150 bombers with nuclear weapons.

We are building and installing missiles so fast that by the end of 1962 we will have not 82 but 180 land-based missiles. In 1963 this number is to triple and our Polaris submarines will double. By 1965, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric said on May 2, 1962, "We will have 950 bombers [most of the old B-47's will be retired] carrying, we hope, 800 air-to-surface missiles including Skybolts as well as Hound Dogs. We will have some 1500 ICBM's operational, including Atlases, Titans, Minutemen and Polarises. *We will have twice the striking power by 1965 that we have at the end of fiscal '62. That is why we feel that no matter what the Soviets can do, based on the intelligence we have today, that we will maintain the margin of superiority that we possess today.*" (Italics added.)

But as the absolute number of missiles increases, merely maintaining our present margin of superiority will not be good enough. To illustrate with an arbitrary example: Let us assume it takes only two of our missiles, given a certain yield, accuracy, and Soviet base hardness, to have a 90 percent chance of destroying one of theirs on the ground. Then if we have 200 missiles and they have 100, we could conceivably strike first expecting only 10 of their 100 missiles to survive and retaliate against us. Maybe some consider this a "credible" threat on our part. But now look at 1965, when we expect to have about 1,000 missiles suitable for counter-force. Suppose the Soviets have 500 missiles. Our missiles are by then bigger and more accurate than today, but theirs, in turn, are more hardened. Assume that as a result we still have a 90 percent chance of destroying one of their missiles with two of ours. We strike first, perhaps to honor obligations in Europe.

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The result? The Soviet Union has not just 10, but 50 missiles left to retaliate with. To hold them to only 10 missiles, their 1962 level, we would need not just 1000 missiles but 1500 to their 500 – not twice, but three times their total. If they should build 1000 hardened missiles, we would need nearly *four* times as many as that to be able to strike first and knock out all but 10. And even if we can do this, is our threat to strike first believable if, as seems possible, these 10 missiles have 100 megaton warheads. Or suppose they build a few dozen missile-carrying submarines. Then is our threat to strike first credible even if we have tens of thousands of missiles? The fact is that our first strike capability can remain effective for only a very few years more (assuming that it is still today) – *unless*, of course, you assume that the Soviets, having absorbed a "no-cities" strike that leaves millions of Russians dead, will be more interested in saving what is left of Russia than in destroying America, and will therefore hit a few US bases and negotiate a peace treaty.

The Cost of a First-Strike Capability

We will pay a high price for counter-force capability. For one thing, if war should break out in 5, 10 or 15 years, the total megatonnage available will be vastly greater because of the intervening arms race. The race will be especially accelerated if either side starts building mass fall-out shelters and the other decides to lay in a stock of especially powerful or dirty bombs to offset the shelters ("just in case"). But even without shelters, delivery vehicles for tens of thousands of megatons are quite conceivable on each side within a few years. Of course only a small fraction of these will be aimed at civilians — *if* the no-city strategy is actually followed when war comes. But if it isn't, the result will be an even greater catastrophe for both sides (and conceivably even for the rest of the northern hemisphere) than if both sides had limited themselves to building finite deterrence forces.

A second major cost of the counter-force first strike strategy is that it leads us directly away from arms limitation and eventual disarmament.

a. It accelerates the arms race and expands it into new areas of science and technology.

b. By making the major powers fear surprise nuclear attack, it increases the mutual fear, suspicion, distrust and hatred which is already today a major roadblock to any form of arms limitation.

c. It reinforces and even legitimizes the Soviet tendency to paranoia on the question of secrecy. If the Soviets can really keep some of their base locations secret, as they apparently hope to do, a highly successful US counter-force first strike will be impossible. If they allow disarmament inspectors to go about the country, as we insist, a US first strike may be made more feasible in a crisis.

d. The US advantage in numbers of missiles required for Mr. McNamara's policy makes it more dangerous for the Soviets to cut fixed numbers, or even fixed percentages, from their nuclear forces. The 30 percent cut in nuclear forces which the US has proposed at Geneva would make a US first strike easier, not harder (for the same reasons, explained above, that a 30 percent increase in forces on both sides would make a US first strike harder).

Finally, a first strike counter-force strategy may well cause a general nuclear war. It encourages the spread of nuclear weapons to more and more countries, eager to gain some protection against a Soviet or an American first strike, or to gain bargaining power in a world where nuclear weapons are the main chips; it makes the use of strategic weapons as deterrents to limited attacks more plausible and hence more probable; it helps perpetuate the myths that the US can win or prevail in a nuclear war, that we are omnipotent and can shape the world as we want to see it, and that we don't have to negotiate or compromise on issues of great importance to us; it obstructs movement toward disarmament or even significant arms control; and finally, by making a US first-strike seem possible to the Soviets it increases the chances of a preemptive Soviet strike, especially during any limited war. In other words, the counter-force strategy encourages the Soviets to assume that if they don't go first, the US will, and that they had better pre-empt in order to get the advantage of launching their forces intact.

A major drive behind the counter-force strategy is the belief that pure deterrence of all-out war is not enough, that such a war is likely to come, and that we must be prepared with a defense strategy which will allow us to fight it and if possible win it. But in the nuclear age the best weapons systems and strategies for successfully fighting and winning a war are not the best ones for preventing that war. The more we prepare to try to win a war, instead of to forestall it, the more likely we are to have to fight it.

Many high officials within the Administration recognize that in the long run, Mr. McNamara's strategy would lead away from disarmament and toward nuclear war. But in the short run, they say, we need it to provide increased bargaining power *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union on Berlin and other matters. Giving up our first-strike potential therefore depends on finding some other way to preserve the freedom of Berlin. Surely this is not an insoluble problem. The West can more than match the Soviets in non-nuclear forces, in political ingenuity and appeal, and in economic power. Our nuclear weapons should be limited to their only rational purpose: preventing the Soviets from using theirs.

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Has the Panama Canal a Future?

by Leopoldo Aragon

On July 6, Sen. Warren G. Magnuson (D, Wash.), Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, introduced an Administration bill to authorize the Panama Canal Company to conduct preliminary surveys on possible sites for digging a new canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

The present Panama Canal was built by virtue of a 1903 treaty between the US and Panama. Two cards (TC 774.B943 and E183.72S) from the Library of Congress suffice to give an idea how the Panamanians feel about the Treaty. One says: "... Authentic history of the scandalous negotiation of the Panama Canal Treaty; written by the author of the convention Mr. Philippe Buneau-Varilla," and the other "Panama-United States relations. A situation that must be changed for the welfare of Panama and the honor of the United States. True history of the Panama Canal Treaty, born from fraud, perfidy, inequity, dishonor, coercion, chicanery, menace, disloyalty and injustice. By the Panama Society for International Action."

And indeed the Treaty was the product of classic 19th Century imperialism. In the first place, Panama in 1903 was a province of the Republic of Colombia. After the bankruptcy of the French Canal Company, the US government, anxious to build a canal of its own in the area, had offered Colombia the Herran-Hay Treaty. The Colombian Senate had unanimously rejected it. With the help of two US cruisers and six high-minded and selfless Panamanians – the Fathers of their Country – the "independence" of Panama was accomplished by a bloodless revolt on November 3, 1903. Four days later, Secretary of State Hay recognized the "baby Republic" as an independent state, "under the wings of the American eagle."

Meanwhile a Frenchman named Philippe Buneau-Varilla, President and Director-General of the French Canal Company, had been in Washington trying to unload the worthless stock of his enterprise for $40 million. M. Buneau-Varilla was now appointed Plenipotentiary of the new Republic to negotiate the Canal Treaty. This power was given him by two of his Canal Company employees, one of whom later became the first President of Panama. Ten days later, the Frenchman had his money, paid by the US Government, and Panama had a treaty of sorts. The treaty made Panama virtually an American protectorate, giving the US the right to keep order throughout the country. It also provided the new government with $10 million to start paying its bills, and $250,000 a year rent for the Canal Zone. In that Zone, a swath 10 miles wide and 50 miles long down the middle of Panama, the US acquired perpetual rights "as if it were the sovereign."

When the Fathers of the Country saw what their man in Washington had done, they tried to back out. They were thereupon told by President Theodore Roosevelt to ratify the treaty or he would give orders for the withdrawal of the cruisers *Nashville* and *Dixie* from Panamanian waters and "let the Colombians take you back." The Fathers relented. "I took Panama," TR boasted.

Still, it was not until Americans started pouring into Panama that Panamanians began to realize that they had not only granted certain concessions but that, according to the US interpretation, they had deprived themselves of all rights in the Canal Zone. No Panamanian stores could operate there; no courts of law except US courts (that had the right to try Panamanians for offenses under US law, in trials conducted in English); no Panamanian flags could be flown in the Zone; no taxes could be collected by Panama from its own citizens working there; it could have no say about imports, immigration or anything that might imply the least vestige of Panamanian sovereignty over the Zone.

Since 1903, the population of Panama has grown from 125,000, 95 percent of whom were illiterates, to a million, 80 percent literate people. There has also been steadily mounting dissatisfaction with the Canal Treaty, which at times has erupted in violence and bloodshed. The clause giving the US the right to keep order has been done away with, and the Canal Zone's rent raised to $1.9 million a year, but Treaty revision remains a national obsession.

The Panamanians want recognition of their sovereignty over the Canal and the Canal Zone; flying of their flag over the Canal, including military installations and ships in transit; mixed courts of law; use of Panama's postage in the Zone; sovereign control over certain piers at the terminal ports of Cristobal and Balboa; termination of the US consular *exequatur* for Consuls operating in Panama and the Canal Zone; and abrogation of the "perpetuity" clause. They also have some economic and social claims, such as "greater

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Panamanian participation in the benefits of the Canal operation," "cessation of commercial competition in the Canal Zone" (which last year did some $20 million gross business); "equal employment conditions, opportunities and pay for Panamanians and Americans."

Their most recent effort was made last month by President Roberto Chiari during a trip to Washington. President Kennedy listened sympathetically to the Panamanian plight, but promised no immediate change of anything fundamental in the Treaty. Congress "would not stand for it at this time," for Fidel Castro would then have a precedent supporting his claims on the Guantanamo Naval Base. Nevertheless, in a cautiously worded memorandum, the US joined Chiari in acknowledging the need to revise it fully in "three or four years' time." The Presidents also agreed to appoint delegations – now meeting in Panama – whose aim, according to Chiari, is "to find and recommend conciliatory formulae."

Why postpone revision for three or four years? Because by that time negotiations for the construction of a sea-level canal, perhaps by atomic excavation, would make discussions of the old Treaty obsolete. The US has already notified Panama, Colombia and Nicaragua of its desire to make further studies on possible routes for a new canal through those countries. It is understood that the Atomic Energy Commission has its heart set on one of two sites in eastern Panama, between the present Canal and the Colombian border. That the main job of opening the ditch can be done cheaper with atomic power, the Atomic Energy Commission is wholly convinced. For example, Project Chariot in Alaska is estimated to cost some $26 million by conventional means, and less than $5 million with atomic power. Conversely, one of the two sites in eastern Panama could be opened up for some $2.5 billion by conventional means, but probably for around half a billion with atomic power.

The Columbine Plan

But will the US necessarily build the new canal? Not if the unpublished *Primer Plan Colombino* (First Columbine Plan) now being promoted by an influential private Panamanian-Colombian group is adopted.

The *Plan* calls for the creation of an international company, initiated, presided over and under the sovereign domain of the host country, for the construction, operation and maintenance of an interoceanic seaway. *Plan Colombino* envisages a worldwide subscription of stock, open to individuals as well as to companies and governments, with the proviso that no single country – either directly or indirectly – will hold a commanding number of shares. Exception is made for the host country, or for a common Latin American pool of shares, this pool being the only one authorized to buy any stock that any stockholder might wish to sell in the future. The blowing open of a ditch by atomic power would be a matter for bidding among the atomic powers of the world, based purely and exclusively on economic considerations.

Plan Colombino assumes the sea-level canal company will be a profitable venture. Projections show that – apart from loan service outlays – a sea-level canal could be operated and maintained for less than $5 million annually – about 5 percent of the current operating costs. This figure gives rise to high return expectations, considering that in 20 years' time some 15,000 ships would be using the canal (a volume that the present one will not be able to handle) against 11,000 last year. By the year 2000, the number of ships transiting the canal would be almost double the present level, as would the income from tolls: about $120 million if the present rates are maintained. The sea-level canal would be wide enough for all vessels likely in the foreseeable future. The locks of the Panama Canal are already too narrow for some 500 ships now plying the seas.

One drawback the Plan discounts is Article V of the 1903 Treaty, which says in part: "The Republic of Panama grants the United States, in perpetuity, the monopoly for the construction, maintenance and operation of any system of communication . . . across its territory, between the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean." Since 1936, when some modifications were introduced to the original Treaty, Article V has been as good as dead, for Panama then obtained the right to build a trans-isthmian highway connecting Colon in the Caribbean with Panama City in the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, the Plan asserts the US has no way of enforcing Article V short of physical violence.

The *Primer Plan Colombino* is almost certain to be backed unanimously by the legislature in either Panama or Colombia. Dissidents would risk their jobs, and perhaps more, at the hands of an enraged citizenry. Panama public opinion would never tolerate another bilateral arrangement for canal building with the United States. The *Colombino Plan* will also solve the question of Panama's sovereignty over the Canal and the Canal Zone. "What" – it asks – "would the United States do with an obsolete Canal and a piece of land in hostile territory?" Is the US going to hold stubbornly on to them "in perpetuity"? The Plan hopefully answers its own question: "The US will have to give them up and return the Zone to Panama."

The *Primer Plan Colombino* idealistically ends by saying that "seeing several atomic powers employ their weapons of destruction for peaceful purposes will be a beautiful sight to behold in this world plagued by dissension and hatred. Panama or Colombia will be proud to be the ground for this tournament of peace."

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Madison and the Prayer Case

by Irving Brant

If the Supreme Court had decided that the New York law setting up a non-sectarian and non-compulsory prayer for use in the schools does not violate the constitutional prohibition of an establishment of religion, it would, in effect, have held that the Constitution requires that Congress and the states "shall make no law respecting an establishment of *denominational* religion." And this interpretation seemingly would find favor with a number of religious leaders who may not be wholly unfamiliar with the history and purpose of the establishment clause. Thus Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr has been quoted in these pages as saying: "The First Amendment . . . merely meant to prevent the establishment of a particular religion or the suppression of a particular religion, which is necessary in a pluralistic society and the basis for all religion."

That was the contention in *Everson* v *Board of Education* – the 1948 New Jersey bus case – in a brief *amici curiae* filed by attorneys for the National Council of Catholic Men and National Council of Catholic Women. In that case, the lawyers for Arch Everson ignored religion and took the stand that payment of the fares of children attending parochial schools was unconstitutional as a private use of public funds. The critical issue in the case, not dealt with in oral arguments, was presented in a brief of the Catholic "friends of the Court." The words "an establishment of religion," they contended, were "technically associated with the creation and maintenance of a formal State Church." Their historical meaning was to be found in "the English State Church System which was then known and still is known as The Establishment." The only purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit "an establishment of religion on the style of The Establishment."

Although the Supreme Court upheld the bus-fare payments, 5 to 4 (with Justice Black writing the majority opinion), it did so on the ground that payment of the fares of *all* school children was not an aid to religion but a general public service. The interpretation of the First Amendment offered by the lawyers for the Catholic societies was rejected by all nine Justices, the majority asserting that any support of religion out of public revenues was an establishment forbidden by the First Amendment, the minority contending that bus-fare payments for parochial school children were such a support and therefore unconstitutional. Justice Black, in presenting the views of the Court, stated the constitutional case against tax support of religious schools so forcefully that the actual decision of the Court did not seem fully in harmony with the major premises of the opinion sustaining it. A year later these same premises were stated once again, this time as a majority opinion, in the *McCollum* decision against "released time" for religious classes in public school buildings. Still later, in the *Zorach* case, the Court upheld the release of pupils for religious services not held on the school premises, with Justice Douglas speaking for the majority and Justices Black and Jackson writing vigorously in dissent.

The *Everson* case merits further attention at this time, especially because of the discussion of it in Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in the "school prayer" case. Although, in *Everson*, he was one of the five who upheld the payment of bus fares, he says now in *Engel* v *Vitale:* "The *Everson* case seems in retrospect to be out of line with the First Amendment. . . . Mr. Justice Rutledge stated in dissent what I think is durable First Amendment philosophy."

Here is what appears to be a public notification by Justice Douglas that if the lights now available had been thrown on the *Everson* case when it was before the Court, he would have helped make up a majority holding the New Jersey law unconstitutional. Certainly it seems to leave no doubt about his stand if Congress votes money to support parochial schools. This does not necessarily indicate a change of opinion by Justice Douglas. The *Everson* decision invited retrospect. In that case, the issue of "establishment of religion" was not argued by the opposing lawyers, but the Court was compelled to deal with it because the brief of the Catholic lawyers was in the record. If that brief were ignored, a decision rejecting the argument about private use of public money might have looked like an endorsement of public aid to religious schools.

Comparing the *Everson* arguments with the opinions that resulted, it seems evident that the basic issue – that of aid to religion – was brought to the fore by Justice Rutledge in the conference room, and that his dissenting opinion was the result of research conducted by him during the Court's deliberation on the case. Three Justices – Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton –

IRVING BRANT's *six volume biography of President Madison has recently been brought to completion with publication of* James Madison, Commander-in-Chief.

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agreed with him that payment of the bus fares, although extended to all school children, was a use of tax money for support of religion, and was an "establishment of religion" within the meaning of the First Amendment." The majority agreed that this was indeed the issue, but reached an opposite conclusion about it. Justice Douglas today takes a stand with the four dissenters, creating what might be termed a retrospective majority against such bus fares.

Still more significant is the lengthy quotation from the Rutledge dissent presented by Justice Douglas as "durable First Amendment philosophy." There cannot be freedom of religion, safeguarded by the state, wrote Justice Rutledge, if the church or its agencies intervene in the state's domain or if they are dependent on the state's largesse. "The great condition of religious liberty is that it be maintained free from sustenance, as also from other interferences, by the state. For when it comes to rest on that secular foundation it vanishes with the resting." Said Justice Rutledge: "Public money devoted to payment of religious costs, educational or other, brings the quest for more. It brings too the struggle of sect against sect for the larger share or for any. . . . The end of such strife cannot be other than to destroy the cherished liberty."

It should be noted that everything here quoted from Justice Rutledge would be endorsed by Justice Black, even though it was written in dissent from his opinion. Similar convictions were voiced by Justice Black in *Everson* and have been repeated by him since. He differed with Justice Rutledge only on the specific question whether bus-fare payments were part of the educational process, and, consequently, of a religious process. Where that doubt does not exist – as in bills for federal aid to education now before Congress – the words of Justice Rutledge express the firm and settled position of the Supreme Court that such a use of public funds for religious schools is unconstitutional. With that in mind, let us look at this "durable First Amendment philosophy" more closely.

Madison's "Memorial"

Justice Rutledge was not voicing conjectural conclusions unbacked by history. He gave 11 citations to support the portion of his *Everson* dissent that is quoted by Justice Douglas. All of them refer to numbered paragraphs in a document that once was known to virtually every literate man and woman in the United States – James Madison's 1785 "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments." The same document furnished Justice Black with the concluding paragraph of his "school prayer" opinion.

It is not solely because the First Amendment on religious liberty came from Madison that the Supreme Court looks to him today for its significance. More than any other person, he clarified the thinking of the American people during the half century in which, by state action, they were knocking out established churches before the federal government acquired authority to do so. Virginia had an established church – the Anglican – when Madison wrote at the age of 23 that the "diabolical, hell-conceived principle of persecution" was raging in his neighborhood, with "five or six well-meaning men in close jail for publishing their religious sentiments." Two years later, in Virginia's revolutionary convention of 1776, he secured a declaration in the basic law that "all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience."

At that time, Madison was defeated in an attempt to disestablish the Anglican church, but his guarantee of freedom of conscience was hailed by dissenters, in the words of those in Prince Edward County, "as the rising sun of religious liberty, to relieve them from a long night of ecclesiastical bondage." It marshaled the forces that enabled Jefferson, in three years, to overturn the tithes system and the formal establishment.

The Anglicans of Virginia then turned to the device whose counterpart is being advocated today – tax support of religion in general, without identification of the sects among whom the money is to be divided. In his opening speech in the General Assembly against "A Bill establishing a provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion," Madison declared that religion was totally outside the purview of civil authority. Tax support was a violation of freedom of conscience.

Owing to Virginia's "rotten borough" system, which partially disfranchised western Presbyterians and Baptists, the bill at the outset commanded majority support, but Madison was able to throw it over to the next session. During the recess he wrote and published his "Memorial and Remonstrance." It swept the state, solidifying the Presbyterians, rallying the Baptists, Methodists and Catholics, splitting the Anglican laity, and piling up so many thousand signatures that the bill was not even presented in the next session.

The whole drive of this memorial – a lengthy pamphlet – was against tax support of religious teachers as "an establishment of religion." Variants of that phrase were used over and over – "establish Christianity," "the establishment proposed by the bill," "the establishment in question," "the proposed establishment," "the legal establishment," "any one establishment," (opening the way to) "any other establishment in all cases whatsoever." With this broad meaning of "an establishment of religion" made overwhelmingly evident in this memorial, which was the precursor of the First Amendment, could anything be more illogical than to contend that the very same words when inserted into the federal Constitution refer only to the formal

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establishment of an official state church?

Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance" dwelt on two main themes – the disintegration of the community and demoralization of religion and the state resulting from governmental intervention in religion, and the danger of letting the evil grow to monstrous proportions by failing to check it in its small and alluring beginnings. He likened the moderate levy for support of teachers of religion to the three-penny tax on tea which brought on the American Revolution.

"It is proper," he wrote, "to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of citizens, and one of the noblest characteristics of the late Revolution. The freemen of America did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the principle."

Ecclesiastical Monopolies

That is what the Supreme Court has done in the "school prayer" case, and what it failed to do in the *Everson* case. This brings us to the numerous minor instances in which precedents and continuing practices have brought the government into the field barred by the First Amendment. Madison himself, late in life, dealt with these in his essay on ecclesiastical monopolies. Here he wrote:

"Is the appointment of chaplains to the two Houses of Congress consistent with the Constitution, and with the pure principle of religious freedom? In strictness the answer on both points must be in the negative. The Constitution of the United States forbids everything like an establishment of a national religion. The law appointing chaplains establishes a religious worship for the national representatives, to be performed by ministers of religion, elected by a majority of them; and these are to be paid out of the national taxes. Does not this involve the principle of a national establishment?"

The same constitutional principle, Madison thought, extended to Army and Navy chaplainships. Precedent had established the congressional and military chaplainships. The problem was to limit the effect of the constitutional irregularity. Said Madison:

"Rather than let this step beyond the landmarks of power have the effect of a legitimate precedent, it will be well to apply to it the legal aphorism *de minimis non curat lex* or to class it *cum 'maculis quas aut incuria fudit, aut humana parum cavet natura.'* . . . Better also to disarm in the same way, the precedent of chaplainships for the Army and Navy, than erect them into a political authority in matters of religion."

These deviations, then, may be tolerated on the principle that "the law takes no account of trifles," or they may be classed with "blemishes which either carelessness spreads or which human nature too little guards against." The uneasiness Madison felt has been justified by events, for today these same chaplainships are being "erected into a political authority."

Pursuing his thought further in the discussion of ecclesiastical monopolies, Madison wrote that religious proclamations by Presidents of the United States were "shoots from the same root. . . . Although recommendations only, they imply a religious agency, making no part of the trust delegated to political rulers." He recalled that President Washington's proclamation of a day of prayer after the suppression of the Whisky Rebellion was written by Alexander Hamilton as a campaign weapon against the Democrats, and was defended by him in cabinet debate as a political maneuver almost universal in such papers. President Jefferson refused to issue any religious proclamations. Madison himself, as President, did so with reluctance, he said, after Congress adopted a resolution requesting him to set a day of public humiliation and prayer for victory in the War of 1812:

"It was not thought proper to refuse a compliance altogether, but a form and language were employed, meant to deaden as much as possible any claim of political rights to enjoin religious observances . . ."

Madison's exclusion of "political right" left room for political purpose. He achieved the desired deadening effect by citing the Congressional request and limiting the invitation to "societies so disposed." He then scandalized New England by paraphrasing and satirizing a traitorous call to prayer just issued by Governor Strong of Massachusetts. The President set a day to enable those who wished to do so to offer "their common vows and adorations to Almighty God, on the solemn occasion produced by the war in which he has been pleased to permit the injustice of a foreign Power to involve these United States."

Nobody missed the President's acid deviation from Governor Strong's description of the war as one permitted by the Almighty "against the nation from which we are descended, and which for many years has been the bulwark of the Religion we profess." Congressman John A. Harper wrote from New Hampshire that "none, in my presence, had the presumption to attack" Madison's address to the people, although many would have attempted it "if they could have been warranted in success."

How far can ignorance or sanctimony carry the people of this country, when a politico-religious proclamation foisted on President Washington by Hamilton, and one forced on President Madison by Congress and converted by him into barbed satire, are treated today as if they were the emanations of a lost piety?

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Angola or The Azores?

by Ronald H. Chilcote

Should the United States support its NATO ally, Portugal, so as to keep our strategic bases in the Azores? Or should Washington cast its lot with the Afro-Asian bloc and advocate an anti-colonial policy which would win UN votes and possibly bring independence to Portuguese Africa more rapidly? Thus far, we have tried to do both, and US policy has consequently failed to please either the Portuguese or the anti-colonialists.

The US dilemma came to the fore after Angolan and Goan crises in 1961 forced our government into a position displeasing to Portuguese interests. In January of this year Portuguese Foreign Minister Alberto Franco Nogueira implied in a news conference that the US would encounter difficulty in renewing the leases (due to terminate on December 31) which permit a strategic air base at Terceira and a naval base at Santa Maria, two islands in the Azores. In Lisbon a crowd of 2,000 demonstrators demanded US withdrawal from the bases. Secretary Rusk's friendly visit to Lisbon recently was inspired by more than a desire to be courteous.

In 1943 a provision of the Treaty of Windsor allowed advantages granted to Great Britain by Portugal to be extended to permit US use of the Azores bases; in 1948 a new treaty formally included the US. Further Azores agreements signed in 1951 and 1957 incorporated the obligations of the US and Portugal into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

US military experts, believing that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush, insist that the Azores are indispensable to any emergency buildup of Western forces from Europe eastward. The air base is used as a refueling point for transatlantic traffic of propeller-driven US aircraft; it is estimated that long-range jet transport cannot be available for another five years. Without an extension of the Azores agreements, it is argued, Congress would have to appropriate $2 billion to provide the necessary transatlantic jet transport or utilize a network of northern bases plagued by bad weather. The Azores bases were used to move the Marines to Lebanon in 1958, during the Berlin crisis in the autumn of 1961, and for transporting UN forces to the Congo in 1961. In the minds of many in the Pentagon these facts have not been sufficiently taken into account by US diplomacy in the UN.

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Thus, in November, 1960, the US abstained when Portugal was censured as "a menace to peace" by the Trusteeship Committee for refusing to submit annual reports on its "dependent" areas (the vote was 45 to 6). A few months later on March 15, 1961, a motion in the Security Council calling for a UN inquiry into the disorders that had broken out in Angola in February failed to win a majority vote, but the US and the Soviet Union were among the five affirmative votes, the rest having abstained. On the same date, Angolan rebel groups in the Congo launched their attacks on northern Angola, and Portuguese propaganda easily linked the US and Soviet votes with that tragic turn of events. A week later the General Assembly voted 79 to 2 to debate the Angola question, and, in April, the General Assembly by a 73 to 2 vote requested Portugal to undertake reforms in Angola to "protect human rights." A subcommittee was appointed to investigate the situation.

On June 9 Ambassador Stevenson maneuvered to defeat a strongly-worded declaration against Portugal by the Soviet Union submitted to the Security Council, but a more moderate resolution, supported by the US, was passed demanding that Portugal "desist forthwith from repressive measures" in Angola. Again on November 13 the US went along with 32 Afro-Asian nations and Yugoslavia in the Trusteeship Committee in condemning Portugal (83 to 3) for refusing to report on its overseas possessions. A month later, after moderately criticizing the Indian absorption of the Portuguese territory of Goa, the General Assembly, the US concurring, in a 90 to 3 vote reaffirmed the Trusteeship Committee's condemnation of Portugal's failure to provide information on its overseas territories.

In January of this year, the General Assembly voted 99 to 2 to affirm "the unalienable right of the Angolan people to self-determination and independence." Ambassador Stevenson warned Portugal to accept the principle of self-determination and urged that NATO armaments not be used in Angola. Earlier in the month Salazar had stated that Portugal would refuse to collaborate with the UN in matters not "in our direct interest" and that "we shall be among the first countries to abandon the United Nations." Portugal was reported in the Lisbon press to be considering recognition of Communist China in order to guarantee possession of Macao, the tiny Portuguese enclave on the China coast.

Salazar's stubborn colonial policy has brought increased taxes and a higher cost of living to his desper-

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ately poor nation (per capita annual income is about $250). The financial stability sustained through 34 years of dictatorship is deteriorating because of the cost of maintaining the armed forces overseas. Yet if Portugal were to abandon Angola immediately, the result might be another Congo. Few Angolans have been trained to assume the leadership of an independent nation, and tribal divisions in the territory as elsewhere in Africa could lead to chaos. Time to prepare for independence is obviously of utmost importance. Even with this preparation, however, Portugal is unlikely to give up its territory.

Perhaps as a result of US and UN pressure, some reforms have been undertaken, at least on paper. Credit is due to Portugal's young Overseas Minister Adriano Moreira. Among the reforms are the repeal of the *indigenato* (native) statute and the granting of full citizenship to nationals in Portuguese Africa, the establishment of a common market of the overseas territories, reorganization of the administrative and judicial system and the appointment of inspectors to stamp out commercial exploitation of low-cost native labor. In April, Moreira announced a new rural labor code which he says "does away with any distinction between ethnic or cultural groups."

Though such minimal reforms have been initiated, the Portuguese nevertheless do not seem willing to acknowledge that the African territories inevitably will achieve independence. Traditionally, Portugal's colonialization has been justified by the absence of racial conflicts. Now, however, the trend is toward encouraging whites (recruited from Portugal) and Cape Verdeans to settle in troubled areas. New villages are to be settled by soldiers demobilized from units now active in Angola. The diamond monopoly, *Diamentes de Angola* (DIAMANG), has actively encouraged this scheme and has advanced six large loans to the Portuguese Government, the last at $4.2 million.

Reaction to US Policy

What are the consequences of US support of UN condemnation of Portugal? First, in Portugal there have been severe anti-US attacks in the Portuguese press led by the ultraconservative weekly *Agora*. Supported by the government and reactionary elements of the Catholic Church, the press has criticized Protestants in Portugal. Public interrogation of Protestants and suspension of their activities have followed. Several American missionaries have been jailed and later forced to leave Angola. Second, although the US has given moderate support to the Afro-Asian bloc, it has given little material aid to the more than 100,000 Angolan refugees concentrated in the southern Congo. Angolan rebel leaders are well aware of the absence of US medical aid. At the same time they know that Portuguese forces are using US arms, including napalm bombs, guns and ammunition, and even helicopters. Holden Roberto, head of the rebel provisional government established in April, has stated that the provision of arms to Portugal via NATO tends to cancel out US support of the rebel cause at the United Nations. Both Ghana and Guinea support this view.

Portuguese-American communities in the US have also reacted to US policy. In New England, Portuguese-Americans generally support the US anti-colonial stand. Most seem to carefully distinguish between nostalgic ties with their beloved motherland and the Salazar government. They are represented by two state senators and five state representatives in Massachusetts and one state senator and five state representatives in Rhode Island.

Many Portuguese-Americans back the Committee Pro-Democracy in Portugal, headed by Abilio de Oliveira Aguas. Aguas, an old-guard Portuguese Republican, feels that the United States should encourage a revolution to oust Salazar. Objectively reporting most of the news emanating from Portugal is the only Portuguese-language daily in the United States, the New Bedford (Massachusetts) daily *Diário de Noticias*. In contrast, the Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign Affairs, headed by Martin T. Camacho with headquarters in Boston, is attempting to influence Portuguese-Americans to support the Salazar regime. This committee works closely with the public relations firm of Selvage and Lee; both are heavily subsidized by the Portuguese Government (see Daniel Friedenberg's "Public Relations for Portugal," *The New Republic*, April 2 1962). In the Oakland-San Jose (California) community, where the weekly *Jornal Português* rarely deviates from Portuguese news agency propaganda, Portuguese-Americans are most sympathetic to present Portuguese policy.

Sen. John G. Tower (R, Texas) has gone so far as to label the pro-West sympathizer Holden Roberto as a "terrorist murderer." Yet it seems to me that tacit support, at the least, for Roberto and other revolutionaries in Angola is indispensable to constructive relations with a future, independent Angolan government. The Afro-Asian nations are bargaining their UN votes to ensure a firm anti-colonial US policy. Yet the US is unwilling to give up the Azores bases, if that is the price that must be paid to preserve the sincerity of anti-colonial policy. The US commitment to its NATO ally was evident in April with the authorization of a $55 million loan by the Export-Import Bank to assist development plans in Portugal. In the light of these facts, it seems improbable that the US will convince emerging nations of the sincerity of our political objectives.

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Too Timid to Damn, too Stingy to Applaud

by Joseph Heller

To read Alfred Kazin's collection of essays, *Contemporaries*, is to come away with the impression of a man who hates literature and loathes his life's work.

This impression, while possibly not entirely true, is certainly not entirely false. It derives from those selections in the volume which deal with modern fiction, rather than from sections in which he concerns himself with the backgrounds of modern literature and with writers of the past about whom unassailable collective judgments have already been formed. Mr. Kazin is easily at his best when he functions as an educator analyzing works of literature, although he does manage to make Ralph Waldo Emerson sound like a combination of Louis Nizer and Norman Vincent Peale.

Contemporaries
by Alfred Kazin
(Little, Brown; $7.50)

He writes with solemn knowledge and solid authority on Melville, Howells, Emily Dickinson, and Thoreau, and there is a truly superb examination of Theodore Dreiser that does indeed explain why his novels "have survived sixty years of complaint," and contains the startling, though credible, observation "that Hemingway, though a far more delicate and accomplished artist than Dreiser, has never written a novel that has the objective power of Dreiser's best books." In his essay "Ishmael and Ahab," which appeared in 1956 as the introduction to the Riverside Press edition of *Moby Dick*, Kazin expresses ideas and arguments with a language and emotion that convey not only the quality of his subject but its amazing spirit as well; and he creates an almost unresistible urge to rush to the book to begin re-reading it at once. Unfortunately, such flashes of insight and enthusiasm are rare, and when Mr. Kazin comes to the work of those novelists who *are* his contemporaries, his virtues desert him – or conflict violently – and he is often of no value at all.

Kazin's chief weakness as a critic of modern literature is his unwillingness to enjoy it. To write intelligently about authors of the past is largely a matter of scholarship, and Kazin's erudition is enormous; to write intelligently about one's own contemporaries, however, involves the additional factor of *taste*, and in the field of modern fiction he often seems naïve and obtuse. He can speculate plausibly in different parts of the book about the dimensions of fiction and the functions of criticism, but he is incapable of applying his own principles consistently to the specific works he elects to review. In his introduction to *Moby Dick* he writes:

> "This is only to say what we may of any true poem, that we cannot reduce its essential substance to a subject, that we should not intellectualize and summarize it, but that we should recognize that its very strength and beauty lie in the way it is conceived and written, in the qualities that flow from its being a unique entity."

But in his extended comments on the fiction of Faulkner and John O'Hara, of Nelson Algren, Bellow, Malamud, Mailer and Salinger, and even of writers he touches in passing like John Cheever, Paul Bowles and Carson McCullers, he ignores this same statement part by meticulous part, with the predictable result that his characteristic response to the work of his contemporaries is one of mixed emotions. And when Kazin has mixed emotions, pleasure is not often among them.

For the most part, he appears too timid to damn and too stingy to applaud. Even with books and authors he obviously admires, he is incapable of giving praise without nullifying it almost immediately; sometimes he seems to praise *in order to* derogate, setting up comparisons only to prove them invalid. Like the Lord, Mr. Kazin giveth and Mr. Kazin taketh away. And frequently his (Mr. Kazin's) objections are expressed in sentences that are almost unintelligible or plainly absurd. Consider, as an example, the following, which comes toward the end of a laudatory, though repetitious, essay on Faulkner's *Light in August:*

> ". . . there is great power in his work, but little color, and *Light in August*, for all its brilliance, somehow wears the lackluster look of the year in which it was published, 1932."

Unless the English language means something different to Mr. Kazin than it does to the rest of us, this is vacillating gibberish, pure and simple, and the following sentences, which come shortly afterward, are not much better:

> ". . . it is a simple fact that the opening of *Light in August* is so beautiful that nothing else quite comes up to it. On the other hand, it is one of Faulkner's greatest books."

Saul Bellow is a novelist Kazin esteems, but of *Augie March*, Kazin writes: "Even Augie . . . is too much a thought in Bellow's own mind to impress us with the weight that he can put into his plans to outwit life." And of Salinger, he says: "The only thing that Salinger does not do for this [his] audience is to meet with them." The intent of this comment must remain pretty much a thought in Mr. Kazin's own mind. It rankles Kazin that Salinger does have such a large and vocal audience, an audience, as Kazin defines it contemptuously, of "students, student intellectuals, instructors, and generally literary, sensitive, and sophisticated young people," and there is no telling

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"The truth is that the federal idea — like the whole American idea — is a political adventure . . . The free world is grappling with precisely the political equation — the elements of order and the factors of freedom — whose balancing has been the supreme achievement of our nation's history. I believe the historic answer . . . can be found in the federal idea." —NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER

GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER
sums up his convictions on
THE FUTURE OF FEDERALISM
based on his 1962 *Godkin* Lectures at Harvard University

and THE PRESS comments:

JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS in THE WASHINGTON POST — "He does the Nation great service when he propounds the theme of this book . . . it is bold in its conception and sets America's sights high."

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE editorial, What States Owe to Federalism—"Mr. Rockefeller preached at Harvard what he has practiced as Governor — and the Federal system would be stronger if more Governors did likewise."

TIME MAGAZINE cover story, June 15, 1962 — "A revealing record of his philosophy of government and politics." $2.75 at your bookstore

HARVARD
UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

whether his observation is meant to apply to Salinger's work or to his seclusion in New England. If to the latter, it is a tasteless joke that failed; but it is as lively an example of critical wit as can be found in this long collection.

There are a dozen reasons for finding fault with O'Hara's *From the Terrace*, and Kazin manages to miss them all in his personal antipathy for the class of people the book is about. He ends his review on this note:

> ". . . novelists like Mr. O'Hara have finally succeeded in making America seem as unremarkable as themselves."

Now Mr. Kazin, who has served our government by traveling abroad as a member of a number of cultural missions, must certainly know that if America seems unremarkable today, it is not because of novelists like Mr. O'Hara, and that John O'Hara, no matter what else one might wish to say about him, is anything but unremarkable. If he were, Kazin would not remark about him for nearly eight consecutive pages.

Malamud's *The Magic Barrel* "captures the strangeness of Jewish experience brilliantly" and seems to Kazin "masterful and indescribably haunting," but this is not sufficient, because "it is surprising to note, when one closes it, how many of the people fade indistinguishably into each other." Recorders of Jewish experience in this country, from Fannie Hurst to Michael Gold, have employed "a style that has found its last haven in the Hollywood of Irwin Shaw and other nostalgic readers of *PM*." Nostalgic readers of *PM* may find it difficult to determine from the quaint syntax here whether they are being grouped with Irwin Shaw or with Hollywood, or what else Kazin is trying to say.

"The trouble with the book as a novel," is the way Kazin begins a section of praise for James Agee's *A Death in the Family* that also includes the following: "The sense of the father in this book, of both the place he filled in life and of the emptiness created by his death, is one of the most deeply worked out expressions of human feeling that I have ever read." One would have hoped that even Mr. Kazin, after enjoying so profound a response, might suspect that the trouble might lie with his own philosophy rather than with Mr. Agee's novel. Of Philip Roth's story, "Goodbye, Columbus," he writes: "Yet brilliant as this story is, it is not nearly as deep, as many-sided, as moving as *The Great Gatsby*." It is not every critic who would be so bold as to compare a short story this way with a full-length novel, and with an established classic, at that. Roth's story, for that matter, also lacks the great choral finale of Beethoven's Ninth.

In many of Kazin's utterances, there is a suggestion of a kind of narcissistic arrogance that holds opinions are important because he has them, that things are so because he says they are so, and that he, as a critic, is of more interest than his subjects. For example:

> "I am baffled by the enthusiastic reviews it has been receiving from distinguished historians. . . . I cannot see that it contributes anything new to the subject."

> "What I object to most in the book. . . ."

> "I am tired of reading for compassion instead of pleasure."

And on the subject of symbolic meaning:

> "One of the things we now long for in contemporary literature is escape from the tyranny of symbolic 'meaning'."

> ". . . depth of description demands that the writer identify himself with a social force to which he can give symbolic significance."

When Mr. Kazin writes on these levels, he is not criticizing but carping, and to campaign in this fashion so persistently against so many of his contemporaries is not to be discriminating but querulous. His prose may be better than Eisenhower's, and almost as good as *Life's*, but his basic attitude toward current American fiction is hardly more enlightened. It is, in fact, identical: the attitude that books are not good because they are not the books he wants them to be, and that authors are deficient when they do not write their

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Contributing Editor, The New Republic

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

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novels precisely the way he would like their novels to be written. In spirit and in understanding, he appears more contemporaneous with writers of the last century than with American authors from the 1920's onward; and yet, one can easily imagine how he might have ridiculed *Moby Dick* for the megalomania and self-pity of its leading character and for the grandiloquent excesses of language, and how he might have criticized Melville as a writer who "is reduced to the 'mystery of personality' instead of the drama of our social existence." (This last quotation is from a criticism he makes of Salinger.)

And, of course, Kazin fudges a bit on his own past as a critic. The name of Faulkner seldom appears in this volume without some accompanying tribute to the immensity of his talent, and *Light in August* is treated as "a great novel." But Kazin did not think nearly so well of Faulkner in 1942 when he published his *On Native Grounds* (he described Faulkner's "failure" as a novelist) and had almost nothing complimentary to say about this same novel ("... everything is soon engulfed in boiling rhetoric and the impossible plot"). Either it was *Light in August* and other pre-1942 novels by Faulkner that have improved since then, or Kazin's taste. If he is right about Faulkner now, he was wrong about him then; and if he was wrong about *Faulkner* then, then he ought at least to keep in mind that he might be wrong about *anyone* now!

There is naked envy in his passages on Salinger and something close to hatred in his treatment of Norman Mailer, and the target of his resentment in both cases does not seem to be these authors themselves, or even their work, but the large measure of fame both have won. Salinger, he insists, "obviously writes to and for some particular editorial mind he identifies with *The New Yorker* . . ." and concludes this statement with the surprising observation that "a story by Salinger and a passage of commentary in *The New Yorker* now tend to resemble each other." To assume that Kazin is attempting to be cute here is to give him the benefit of much doubt; if he really intends this latter remark to be taken seriously, then he has either not been reading Salinger or not been reading *The New Yorker*.

Norman Mailer he pursues with a malice that is both diffident and tenacious. Mailer, he writes, "is often very brilliant" and "a powerful, courageous talent admirably provoked by our culture," but *The Naked and The Dead* is "too literary," *Barbary Shore* is "a bad novel," and *The Deer Park* is "uneven" and "sick." One wonders what in the world Kazin has ever read by Mailer that justifies his professions of respect. Even in an essay on "The President and Other Intellectuals," Kazin cannot resist an allusion to Mailer's "brilliant if overwritten" article on the Presidential campaign, when it was not necessary to characterize the article at all, since the subject of Kazin's piece was not Norman Mailer but John F. Kennedy.

In this way does he belittle the reputations of two men who labor more successfully to create an interest in serious contemporary literature than he does to destroy it. The pity is that Kazin does have so much knowledge and that his information, when he presents it with some degree of objective clarity, is more often appropriate than not.

That Aura of Personal Distinction

by Irving Howe

Under an awkward title this book brings together the literary journalism written by Isaac Rosenfeld during the forties and fifties. Rosenfeld died in 1956 at the age of thirty-eight, one of those lavishly gifted writers who start out by winning the affection of a cultivated audience, enter a period in which they work with great ambition and purpose, but then, as middle age begins to threaten, lose their sense of direction and succumb to a crisis so shattering as to leave them stricken for months or even years at a time.

An Age of Enormity
by Isaac Rosenfeld
Edited by Theodore Solotaroff
foreward by Saul Bellow
(World; $5)

Every serious writer seems to need this trial of rebirth, by which the notions of youthful success are discarded and a shaken maturity replaces the charms of complacence. Rosenfeld himself did not live long enough to produce the work that might have come from that maturity, and his reputation, which has persisted with a kind of underground tenacity, rests not so much on his magazine writings or even his fine novel *Passage from Home* as on a certain aura of personal distinction he bore with him. Rosenfeld affected people, as few writers do, in a direct and troubling way. One sensed in him a potential for the extraordinary, even while wondering whether he would ever find a way to release it.

The present book, edited with care and affection by a young critic, reads far better than such collections usually do. Rosenfeld was a man of refined intelligence, and he wrote with clarity, masculine force and a notable freedom from the pretentiousness which afflicts young literary men. He was witty, and he loved to entertain, to make things lively. He was well-educated, bringing to his criticism a training in philosophy that enabled him to detect shoddiness and appreciate niceties of argument. Throughout these pieces there is a pleasing consistency of response: he admires writers who take psychic risks, he displays a sharp awareness of the historical pressures buffeting the art of our time, he enjoys precision of thought, but above all he is on the lookout for that final, even painful sincerity of speech which in the forties came to seem a substitute for intellectual system.

Rosenfeld's work is notable in another way: his concerns are representative of his moment and milieu, but his values are notably personal. He was influenced by the Marxism of the thirties, but unlike many other writers who turned from it, he did not lapse into snarling hostility and self-contempt. He was profoundly Jewish in psychology, mannerism, styles of

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JULES FEIFFER

THE PRESIDENT DROPPED BY FOR BREAKFAST YESTERDAY. VERY UNEXPECTED.

WHY, OF COURSE. YOUR HOUSE IS ON THE WAY TO **MY** HOUSE. WE HAD LUNCH.

I TOLD HIM I WAS WRITING MY THURSDAY COLUMN ON EXECUTIVE POWER. I THINK IT'S THE KEY TO **EVERY-THING!**

OH, IS **THAT** WHERE HE PICKED THAT UP? I SHOWED HIM MY FRIDAY COLUMN ON THE COMMON MARKET. **THAT'S** THE KEY TO EVERYTHING.

HE SEEMED TERRIBLY INTERESTED. HE SAID WE COULD DISCUSS IT FURTHER AT THE WHITE HOUSE RECEPTION FOR KATHERINE ANNE PORTER.

THE COMMON MARKET! THE ENTIRE FREE WORLD INCORPORATED INTO A TARIFF FREE EXCHANGE OF MISSILE WARHEADS! A NATO ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS! I TOLD HIM!



POWER, I TOLD HIM. THE DEVIOUS INFLUENCE OF POWER! HE READ MY COLUMN WITH **AVID** INTEREST. EVEN FASTER THAN USUAL.

OF COURSE—HE ALWAYS SAYS TO ME—"JOE, NO MATTER HOW FAST I READ, YOU ALWAYS FINISH THE PAGE AHEAD OF ME."

"MR. PRESIDENT," I SAID (THOUGH I'VE KNOWN HIM FOR YEARS I STILL REFER TO HIM BY HIS CEREMONIAL TITLE), "IF I HAVE HELPED FORM POLICY IN ANY WAY - AS A NEWSPAPER MAN I'D RATHER NOT KNOW ABOUT IT."

"WELL SAID, SCOTTY." HE REPLIED.

"JOE," HE LEAKED TO ME, "YOU'RE WORTH FIFTEEN DEAN RUSKS." "COME OFF IT, SIR" I ANSWERED, "I AM BUT A NEWSPAPERMAN"

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I **AM** THE NEW FRONTIER.

NO, YOU'RE NOT! IT'S **ME!**

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thought, yet free from the sentimentality and exhibitionist aggrandizement of many writers who seized upon Jewishness as a likely subject. He went through the kinds of experience that stamped a good many other young writers of the time – he appeared frequently in *Partisan Review*, briefly edited the literary section of *The New Republic*, taught evenings at NYU – yet he was "Isaac," an individual, perhaps even eccentric figure, whose views could not be predicted from a knowledge of his associations.

Finally, it was neither his individual gifts nor representative role that won for Rosenfeld the interest of other literary people. Both Saul Bellow, who was his close friend, and Theodore Solotaroff, who did not know him at all, write about Rosenfeld less as a writer than as a man: Bellow through a quick nervous recollection, Solotaroff through a sympathetic reconstruction. And this is by no means an accident, for everyone sensed in Rosenfeld a personal quality, an element of style, which deserved attention.

This is quite rare, and in my own experience has been true only of one other writer, James Agee. Like Rosenfeld, Agee gained a reputation in excess of what his occasionally distinguished work might warrant. Both men won the admiration of writers who knew them and readers who did not, and they won it through the hopes they raised that amid the startling wreckage of their lives they might yet reveal something about how to live: a secret of grace, a source of animation, perhaps even a principle of wisdom.

Agee, though I knew him very slightly, struck one as a figure of gallant desperation, a completely romantic man in whom "the Southern quality" had been freed from its provincial origins and become a style of rhetoric and manners. Rosenfeld, whom I knew fairly well, held one's admiration through his devotion to the principle of restlessness and the role of *Luftmensch*. One admired his pleasure in the circumstances that had made him a Jewish intellectual, while also respecting his urge to move, by sheer intensity of desire, beyond the limits of what he was. Intellectually a skeptic, he knew in his own experience a yearning for transcendence, a yearning to hurl himself beyond the definitions of person and place. "The affirmation of life in our time," he wrote, "is an act only a transcendental man can perform, one who would be mad for his joy . . . were he incapable of transcending his experience." And to do this, Rosenfeld was ready to stake everything. Perhaps one way of putting it is that while Jewish to his bones, he sought a way of leaping beyond those constraints which in our time are signified by Jewishness – and all that stood in his way was his body, his country, the times, history.

For all their possible heroism, such efforts bring a heavy price. Rosenfeld began by turning from the political ideology of his youth; he desired an experience that would be direct, unmediated, natural, perhaps even ecstatic; he became caught up for a time with Wilhelm Reich's theories of sexuality; and bitter irony, the writer who had abandoned a public ideology because he wished to get nose-to-nose with reality, ended with an ideology of another and at least as constricting kind. Rosenfeld seems finally to have been aware of this dilemma, though where he would have gone from there one cannot guess.

Does all this sound too vague? No doubt; but it touches on some of the central experiences and problems of intellectuals in the last few decades. Rosenfeld's friends watched his turnings with sadness and respect, for if they suspected his journey was doomed they hoped it would yield an inner reasonableness. No man, it seems, can dispense with the wastefulness of his existence, and at the end little remained for Rosenfeld but a vivid personal signature: the style of comic dialectic, the querying laugh, the fine intelligence spent upon itself.

What's Wrong with TV?

by David Berkman

Here we have, from an economic historian, what is probably the most scathing and thoroughly documented indictment of the whole incredible pattern of immorality which permeates nearly every function and functionary of television. Weinberg's book would be valuable if only for its painstaking examination of the broadcasting industry and its "adjuncts" – *i.e.*, not only the sponsors and ad agencies as we might expect, but the old, and even the new FCC including Newton Minow himself. (Weinberg credits the Chairman with at first having been "the single most active warrior on the New Frontier." But, he charges, Minow has since become a POW – his surrender ordered as part of the Administration's attempt to placate Business: witness the Chairman's statements of late about the great improvements which have taken place in the medium of television, despite the new programming lows reached during this past season.)

TV in America: The Morality of Hard Cash
by Meyer Weinberg
(Ballantine; 75c)

The book's greatest significance, however, derives from Weinberg's case that, contrary to opinions of "eggheads," television does not corrupt – but rather has inevitably itself *been corrupted* by a society whose only allegiance is to what he calls (using a term which he acknowledges borrowing from the socialist editors, Huberman and Sweezy) "the morality of hard cash."

The evidence and reasoning he offers to support that case cannot be swept aside easily.

How, he asks, can TV and advertising be considered the corrupters when they, in turn, are dominated by 50 advertisers who "alone earn one-fifth of all corporate profits in the United States," 17 of whom have accounted for 74 successful federal antitrust actions between 1911 and 1957? In light of this, "Since the Top Fifty establish standards of behavior for their inferiors," should it surprise anyone that the quiz contestants who perjured themselves in their grand jury testimony "were of better-than-average education . . . were almost exclusively white collar and pro-

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fessionals . . . the people in America who are expert in 'handling' or managing others."? "Quiz rigging and payola," he goes on to note, "draw extensive editorial moralizing. . . . [But] not a single practice labeled reprehensible in the world of quiz-rigging and payola failed to originate in the everyday operations of American industry." What else could we expect in a society where "the cardinal rule" reads, "That the great shall profit most and suffer least"? Thus, the 50 percent of the youngsters who were quizzed in one poll and saw nothing wrong with payola, or the additional 20 percent who were willing to excuse the practice when it was their idol, Dick Clark, who engaged in it, simply exhibited a "knowing tone . . . [which] reflected accurate knowledge rather than fashionable cynicism." But then, if Clark were guilty of pushing records in his TV teen dance show – or, more accurately, pubescent sexuality rite – which were made by companies and artists [?] in which he owned a financial interest, just how does this differ from "the spectacle of elected officials voting on direct behalf of their own private interests," as most of the Congressmen who own shares in radio and TV stations did, when they voted against the FCC reorganization plan which the industry opposed, last year?

The major criticism which can be leveled against Weinberg's argument is for his somewhat naïve faith in a fourth, government-supported, cultural network. As this reviewer knows from personal experience while working in state-supported educational television, the pressures exerted by special interest groups – who now simply threaten to write the members of the legislature which votes the operating funds, rather than the sponsors who pay the way in commercial TV – mitigate quite heavily against his hopes that such an undertaking would become "an example of cultural democracy."

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Joseph Heller *is the author of* Catch 22. David Berkman *is a doctoral candidate in Communications at New York University, and a free lance writer.*

Family Life Here and There

The Island (Zenith)
Waltz of the Toreadors (Continental)

The Island is a Japanese film with a family as its hero – a farmer, his wife, and two small sons who scrabble for a living on the small hilly island that is their home. Their principal ethic is to eat, their family motto is "We Survive."

The unsentimental basis of this film, which it depicts unsentimentally, is the rich texture of love that grows in exigency. As Richard Hoggart and Danilo Dolci record, as observation attests, the children of the poor are jewels rather than burdens, and a man and wife are close because of mutual reactions to years of immanent perils. Each knows always what must be done and what the other will do – until tumor takes the mother and hernia takes the father, until the children marry away. Particularly in cultures where poverty is a tradition bequeathed through the generations, particularly outside cities, the poor are a grim, knit, self-protective society among whom the rest of us move like Martians. (See Turgenev's *Sportsman's Sketches*.)

The Island fixes it all: the odd security of knowing exactly their position – on the bottom and ceaselessly struggling; the beauty of their interdependence. The film comes as near as possible to being merely a chronicle. Until the sudden illness and death of the older son, nothing happens except the routine of their life: work, meals, the older boy's school, the traditional holidays. The film's triumph – and its point – is that,


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

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before ten minutes are up, we are all members of the family, sharing their perspective, one with their concerns.

The couple's chief daily chore is lugging water for themselves and their crop. They must row a long distance to shore, trudge inland to a stream, carry yokes of buckets to the boat, row back to their island, and then, step by painful step, labor up a steep path to their sloping field where they carefully dole out cupfuls on their bean-plants. This chore, by its ineluctability, acquires a ritual quality, and its hard rhythm is the pulse of the film. When the wife spills a bucket accidentally, we expect that the husband will hit her for the sacrilege, and we know that she expects it. After the death of her son, she overturns a bucket in futile protest against the pain and loss, and we know that this time the husband will merely watch the outburst, during which she pulls up plants until her frenzy is spent; then he will turn back to his work. He and she both understand that there is nothing he can say to her; all he can do is keep the pattern going.

At the start of a film like this, one tenses nervously in anticipation of picturesque shots of peasants against the sky. In fact, there is a little of that, as there is a bit too much of the water-lugging; but these are trifling excesses. Kaneto Shindo, the writer and director, has had a vision of inner meaning, not of National Geographic illustrations.

Shindo, who entered films in 1934 and worked for many years as a scriptwriter until he became a director in 1951, has made this picture without a line of dialogue. (There is a lot of music, however – which sounds like French café songs and is inappropriate.) The absence of speech and the subject matter suggest neo-realism, but, on the contrary, his film deals a much-needed blow to the fallacies of that school. His principals are artists, not "people." The wife is played by Nobuko Otawa, a well-known actress who is also a writer and lecturer on acting. She and Taiji Tonoyama, the husband, are members of Shindo's "stock company." To note that there is never a moment of doubt in the picture that these two have spent their whole lives on this island is a tribute not only to their talents but to their thorough understanding. This is more than a *Man-of-Aran* combat with the elements. It is a fully realized little epic of the family as the last and first barrier against chaos: a way of life that needs no rationale, that is its own purpose.

To see how their world meshes – the difficulties met and shared without comment, the children running (*always* running) to do their own appointed tasks – is to perceive the strength in order. Each of the four is a pillar of their common, small universe. It is impossible to imagine these children growing up lost or bewildered; and it is no bourgeois beatification to say the film lays bare the secret of this impoverished family: they are happy.

A different sort of family life was portrayed in Jean Anouilh's play, *Waltz of the Toreadors*, which, despite its indecisiveness of tone and skin-deep profundities, included a few searingly honest scenes between husband and wife. In the film, which has been transposed to England, the confusion of tone is increased and the bile diluted. The result is a clumsy blend of horseplay and very mild mordancy.

This quasi fantasy about a general retired in all but amorousness, his invalid but all-seeing wife, and his insanely devoted non-mistress, has Peter Sellers as its star. He blows the hottest and the coldest of any major performer on the screen today. Although he is not yet clearly an actor, some of his imitations (as in *Lolita*) have been superb. One would have expected him to revel in at least the superficial characteristics of this General Blimp. He quite misses them; and of course he is totally incapable of such bitterness and bite as remain in the part. Margaret Leighton, queen of actresses, cannot successfully weld the scene in which she rides off in her peignoir on a bicycle with her serious denunciation scene. Dany Robin is null as the inamorata. Charming Cyril Cusack, the doctor, is burdened with a lot of tired antique-car gags.

This is one more example of the film where, at the outset, all concerned presumably rubbed their hands and chortled: the right "property," the right star, the right cast; and where, from then on, almost every detail of adaptation, direction, and performance was studiously botched.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

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Correspondence

Religious Philosophy

Sirs:

Congratulations are due to the editors on their willingness to give space to a four-page review article on the prolific output of Professor H. A. Wolfson (July 2). It is good that scholarship of this sort should be brought to the attention of readers of *The New Republic.* Oscar Gass' performance, however, did not measure up to the opportunity.

Of the new book of . . . essays which was the occasion of the article, Gass comments on only two of those essays. Between them the more extensive treatment is given to the essay on the Pelagian controversy, and here the reviewer gives prominent place to his own outline of the Augustinian position, stated in its most rigid, most non-theological, and (this is apparently important to Gass) most objectionable form. The statement is far from doing justice to the complexity of Augustine's thought. But more importantly, Gass ignores the really significant and original proposal of Wolfson's essay, *viz.*, that Augustine's paradoxical doctrine of freedom rests upon two passages from Aristotle which define two distinct kinds of necessity. In the interest of his own anti-Augustinian polemic Gass misses one of the most important points in the essay upon which he is supposedly commenting.

But it is in his comments on *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers* that Gass is most disappointing. Here he deals briefly with only one of the really substantive issues of that book, the pervasive influence of Philo – and at that he does not illustrate with any precise instances. If he had stopped there, though, it would not have been so bad. Having dealt summarily with Philo, he then goes on, with liberal intent, to expose the "obscurantist" techniques by which Church Councils prohibited the free flow of thought. This is an interesting matter in itself, but Gass' mention of it in this regard must reflect his own preoccupation, because it lies far from the center of Wolfson's attention in the book under consideration. There is nothing in the review about Wolfson's treatment of, for example, Trinitarian theology, of the Christological controversies, of Gnosticism. These and other specifically theological and philosophical problems form the great themes of the book, not the illiberal anathemas of councils against the poor heretics. And who would ever have thought of comparing Wolfson's book with a work so different in scope and subject matter as Gilson's *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages?*

Robert F. Evans
Assistant Professor
Department of Religious Thought
University of Pennsylvania

Macdonald *v* Shavzin

Sirs:

May I come to Robert Brustein's defense – not that he really needs it – against Mr. Alan Shavzin's spectacularly wrong-headed attack in your July 16 issue? Mr. Shavzin confesses, with charming candor, that he has been unable "to pound my distaste into specific critical terms." This may be because the only concrete objection he develops is that Brustein didn't like Ellis Rabb as Lear. He does attempt three generalizations, but they are unsupported by either reasoning or examples. "Narrow urbanity . . . aesthetic dogmatism . . . superficiality of his imagination – when you say that, pardner, explain! But Mr. Shavzin doesn't. Even a broad, undogmatic, non-urban type from Lexington, Kentucky, should have been able to do better.

In my opinion, Robert Brustein for a long time was the best drama critic in these states. The reason for the past tense is that recently there has appeared another critic on his level: John Simon in *Theatre Arts Monthly.* I respect Mr. Brustein and Mr. Simon because they write well, because they have some knowledge of theater and theatrical history (as well as of other branches of culture) and because they are severe and discriminating in their judgments ("aesthetic dogmatism" maybe). May I also add that *The New Republic* has, in Stanley Kauffmann, by far the best American film critic now going, with the possible exception of the undersigned.

Dwight Macdonald
The New Yorker

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

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